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A. Purpose. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the in-
vestment status of the common stocks of life insurance 
companies from the point of view of the small investor. 
Particular attention will be paid to their unique charac-
teristics and their prospects for future growth. This will 
include consideration of the factors involved in analyzing 
individual companies and determining the market valuation 
of specific securities. 
This appraisal will attempt to reconcile two op-
posing views. On ·the one hand are those who maintain that 
the life insurance industry is so different and so complex 
that only a highly-trained specialist is qualified to render 
an accurate analysis of these securities. The other is that 
life insurance stocks can be analyzed in much the same man-
ner as an industrial stock. 
In more recent years, investors have shown in-
creasing interest in life insurance common stocks. This is 
still minute compared to that focused on the so-called 
"blue-chips" or even the great majority of the stocks 
listed on the major stock exchanges. The most important 
reason for this increased interest is found in the spectac-
ular appreciation in the prices of life insurance stocks, 
particularly since the end of World War II. Between 
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January 1, 1947 and the end of December 1959, the common 
stocks of several of the leading companies increased in 
value by more than 1,000%. Monthly indexes of prices for 
life insurance stocks compared with Standard & Poor's Com-
posite (480 Stock), New York City Bank, Investment Company 
(composite), Fire Insurance, and Casualty Insurance Stock 
Indexes show that life insurance stocks had a much better 
1 
record of price appreciation than any of these others. 
This holds true whether the comparison is made from 1929, 
1949 or later, but it is most marked in the period from 
1947 to 1955. 
Why then, has there been such a dearth of infor-
mation on this type of investment? It is reasonable to 
expect that any class of common stock showing such growth 
in price would attract many investors and a steady stream 
of literature from brokerage houses advocating the purchase 
of shares in this industry. In general, this has not hap-
pened, although articles have recently appeared in various 
publications. 
There can be no argument with the fact that the 
life insurance business is complex. One of the most baf-
fling features is tis accounting procedure. All companies 
must report to state insurance commissions as this is a 
state regulated industry and they must report on the same 
form known as a Convention Blank. This form, however, 
bears only the slightest resemblance to an ordinary balance 
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sheet or income statement and contains many terms peculiar 
to the life insurance business. This complexity may easily 
be the most important reason for the slow growth in interest 
in these securities. 
Mutual life insurance companies, in 1958, ac-
counted for 62% of the life insurance in force in the United 
States. 2 This has led.many investors to believe that the 
stock companies are not important in the field. If the in-
vestor looks at the picture from a slightly different angle, 
he will realize that this means that stock companies ac-
count for 38% of the nearly $522 billion of life insurance 
in force in U. S. companies at the end of 1958, or in 
excess of $198 billion. If it is assumed that growth will 
continue at anywhere near the rate of the past, the stock 
companies cannot be considered a small factor. 
The supply of life insurance stocks has also been 
limited compared to other classes of common stock. The 
market value of the stocks of several of our leading cor-
porations each exceeds the total market value of the fifty 
leading stock life companies. All but a few of the life 
companies would be classed as small concerns by the average 
investor and many are quite new. In the past eight years 
over 700 additional companies have entered the life in-
surance business bringing the total to nearly 1400. Many 
of these small new companies may be licensed to do business 
in only one state where the regulations are not very strict. 
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Such companies are often not financially sound. Interest 
has, therefore, been concentrated in the relative handful 
of leading companies which has further restricted the sup-
ply of suitable shares available. These shares are not 
listed on any of the major organized stock exchanges, which 
presents another obstacle because many investors avoid the 
Over-The-Counter market as a matter of principle. 
Many investors have turned away from life insur-
ance stocks because of their low yields. These companies 
commonly reinvest 75-80% of their net gain from insurance. 
Although this is a favorable factor to the investor inter-
ested in long-term gain, it leaves little from which to pay 
current dividends. The result is that most companies, to-
day, pay dividends that yield less than 2%. 
One of the peculiarities of the stock market, in 
recent years, has been the obsession of many investors with 
ttglamour stocks" such as missiles, jets, automation, data 
processing, etc. The record of growth in the life insuran ce 
industry is of no interest to these investors simply because 
the industry does not meet their o'nl special qualifications 
of a growth field. This is another obstacle that, while 
it is not major, certainly works to decrease the number of 
people interested in life insurance stocks. 
The life insurance industry, today, is of tre-
mendous size and of vital importance to the economy of this 
country. At the end of 1958, 112 million Americans were 
I, 
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providing for the future needs of themselves and their fam-
ilies through life insurance companies. About six out of 
seven families in this country are estimated to have at 
least one member who owns some form of life insurance. 
Purchases of life insurance rose in 1958 to $66.8 billion, 
an increase of 21% over 1956, but only fractionally above 
1957. Insurance in force increased 8% over 1957 as compared 
to the average growth of the entire American economy of 3 
4% per year. Life insurance and annuity benefit payments 
reached a record $7.2 billion in 1958, but this rate of 
growth has been slower than that of ownership. Actually, 
59.8% of these benefit payments were what the industry calls 
living benefits, as opposed to death benefits. Thus, the 
industry's impact on the economy is in direct contrast to 
the interest shown by investors in the stocks of its repre-
sentative companies. 
A brief examination of the statistics of the in-
surance industry reveal, without question, the size of the 
industry, and yet there has bien an apparent lack of in-
terest on the part of a large segment of the investment 
community. The situation warrants objective examination and 
an attempt to clear aw~y some of the vague and confusing 
misconceptions regarding the analysis of and investment in 
life insurance common stocks. 
B. Plan of Study. 
The analysis of life insurance common stocks __ ,_ 
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confronts the investor with numerous unfamiliar problems. 
This is true even of the professional investor or analyst. 
There is sufficient statistical data a~ailable, but the 
difficulty arises in attempting to put it into meaningful 
form. 
The first step, therefore, is to put the industry 
into its proper perspective. An understanding of the theory 
upon which the entire industry is based is a vital prerequi-
site for analysis. Herein lies one of the pitfalls. Many 
investors do not have any conception of what life insurance 
involves and should not expect to understand the operations 
of the industry until they have such knowledge. From this 
base, it is then possible to fill in the background by dis-
cussing the historical development and growth of the industry. 
No attempt will be made to trace the entire year by year 
progress, but instead emphasis will be placed on those events 
whose importance was ·so great that their influence is still 
strongly felt. 
The competitive situation of the industry is also 
extremely important, as it comes from sources both within 
the industry and outside it. This will be discussed in 
considerable detail as will those factors both present and 
future which may influence the sale of life insurance. 
In order to simplify the operations of life in-
surance companies ~s much as possible the analysis will be 
arranged in the same form as a profit and loss or income 
11 . 
statement. Thus, the sources of income will be discussed 
first, and then the costs, or the application of the funds. 
The result of this income and outgo is the net gain from 
operations. This will be analyzed in considerable detail, 
because it is so completely different from the net income 
figure arrived at in the statements of the average indus-
trial company. 
Earnings growth is a prerequisite for appreciation 
in the common stock of life insurance companies. Therefore, 
the determination of this growth and the value to be placed 
on it is essential to the investor. An analysis will be 
made of the various key factors that make up this valuation 
with reference to the leading companies in the industry. 
With this study as a starting point, the small investor 
should be able to develop an adequate understanding of the 
life insurance industry and its companies. He should also 
be able to make a reasonably accurate analysis of the pros-
pects of individual companies and the market valuation to 
be placed on their earnings. 
Various sources will be used in developing the 
material for this study. Annual statements are on file in 
the state insurance commissions. Statistical data is pub-
lished by a few investment houses and by certain industry 
organizations. There are, also, numerous insurance pub-
lications which do not deal with investment features of 
the industry, but which will provide related information. 
12 
Discussions with personnel, both in the insurance industry 
and the investment industry, will furnish additional details. 
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CHAPTER II 
PERSPECTIVE 
A. 1Vhat is ~ife Insurance. 3 ' 4 
Life insurance offers a voluntary, long-term plan 
whereby a person may join a risk-sharing group through the 
purchase of a contract. In return for a stipulated con-
sideration, known as a premium, the insurer agrees to pay 
to the insured, or to persons specified by the insured, a 
fixed sum upon the occurrence of a specified event such as 
the death of the insured. 
Insurance is based on three principles: loss 
sharing, large numbers and equality of risk. Through loss-
sharing, the serious losses of a few are paid for by the 
contributions of the many who are exposed to the same risks. 
Thus, the certainty of a small loss is substituted for the 
uncertainty of a large one. The second principle is that, 
for practical purposes, the group insured must be large 
enough to eliminate violent year to year fluctuations in the 
shares of losses and to absorb catastrophic loss. This 
means simply allowing the law of averages to work. The 
third principle is that the share of losses to be paid by 
any individual insured should be proportionate to the risk 
incurred by him. Therefore, all risks are divided into 
broad classifications in which the risk is similar and each 
is charged the same share of all the losses that incurred 
in that class. 
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By the nature of life insurance, the possibility 
of the event insured against occurring increases each year 
because the chance of death increases with age. The life 
insurance policy must be designed to accumulate an adequate 
fund to meet this absolutely certain claim that will eventu-
ally occur. The accumulation of this fund is vital and 
involves several important considerations. For practical 
purposes, it is desirable, in most cases, to charge the in-
sured a uniform or level premium rather than an increasing 
one. This means that a sum in excess of that required to 
pay the current cost of protection must be collected in the 
early years of a policy when mortality rates are lower. 
This sum, or policy reserve, accumulates through investment 
and is then drawn on during later years when the level pre-
mium becomes insufficient for the then current cost of 
protection. When a large number of policies are combined, 
the sum of the policy reserves on each one represents a 
fund which, together with future premiums payable and in-
terest earned on the fund, will just enable the company to 
meet all claims under the policies. 
Because policies are written on people of different 
ages, they will remain in force for varying lengths of time, 
and the premiums collected and interest earned will also 
vary. Many different kinds of policies are written by com-
panies offering a wide variety of benefits. Actually, the 
great majority of policies involve some combination of 
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insurance protection and investment. For each different 
type of policy and for each age, a company must compute the 
premiums to be charged to the insured. 
The calculation of premiums is based on three 
factors; mortality, interest and expense. The company must 
make a conservative assumption as to the rates of mortality 
which will be experienced in the future. Mortality tables 
showing past experience are usually safe and conservative 
simply because insured people have kept on living longer on 
average. The company also makes a conservative assumption 
as to the rate of interest it will earn in the future. 
From the mortality table the company determines the amount 
required to meet future death claims. If the entire premium 
were paid immediately, .the company knows the amount of 
money that would be earned through investment of this pre-
mium based on compound interest at the assumed rate. This 
net single premium is then adjusted to reflect the fact 
that most policies are based on annual premiums rather than 
single premiums. Because companies also incur expenses 
and must provide for contingencies, an amount is added to 
the net premium to cover these costs. This is known as the 
leading and the resulting premium which the insured pays is 
the gross premium. 
In the case of non-participating policies as 
issued by most stock companies, the loading must be de-
termined as accurately ax possible because there can be no 
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adjustment through policy dividends. Companies writing 
participating policies usually pay a dividend or refund of 
premium to policyholders which reflects, in part, the actual 
expenses incurred. 
It should now be clear that the ability of a com-
pany to make a profit on each new policy written is increased 
through the occurrence of any one or all of three events. 
If on average, the company's insureds live longer than was 
assumed in the mortality table, then funds are not required 
as soon as scheduled to meet claims, and these funds also 
continue to earn compound interest. If, in addition, the 
company earns interest on its investments above what was 
assumed in the premium calculations, earnings are given a 
further boost. In the third case, the ability of a company 
to hold actual expenses below that provided for in the 
loading would also generate increased profits. Although, 
in the life insurance industry, actual profits arise from 
several sources, the investor must realize that apparent 
profits are also affected by the manner in which such items 
as reserves are treated on the books of the company. These 
• 
points will be expanded in later sections. 
B. Definitions. 
The investor, who is not familiar with life in-
surance, will have difficulty unless he understands the 
words and phrases that are used in the industry. The de-
finitions listed below cover some of those in more common 
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usage. 
Participating Insurance: Insurance in which 
policyholders have the right to share in the surplus earn-
ings of the company. This dividend, or refund of premium, 
is based on the actual operating experience of the company 
plus an estimate of future trends. 
Non-Participating Insurance: Insurance in which 
the policyholders have no right to share in surplus earn-
ings as they belong to the stockholders. 
Ordinary Life Insurance: A type of life insurance 
requiring fixed premium payments during the life of the 
policy. It combines investment with protection and de-
velops steadily increasing cash surrender values. 
Group Insurance: Life insurance or a combination 
of life insurance and accident and health insurance on all 
members of a group of people issued under a master policy. 
Most such insurance is written on renewable term basis at 
low cost without medical examination and without investment 
features. 
• Industrial Life Insurance: Insurance that is 
generally written in small amounts requiring no physical 
examination. The premiums are payable weekly, or sometimes 
monthly, and are usually collected at the home of the 
policyholder. 
tccident and Health Insurance: Insurance pro-
viding protection to the insured against the direct 
18 
financial loss resulting from accident or sickness. 
Policy Reserves: The accumulated amount of the 
excess payments made by the policyholder during the earlier 
years under the level premium plan of insurance. As it 
will, eventually, be required to meet claims, it is a lia-
bility on the balance sheet. 
Legal Reserve Life Insurance Company: A company 
operating under insurance laws which specify the minimum 
basis for the reserves the company must maintain on its 
policies. 
Mutual Company: A life insurance company which 
has no stockholders and is owned and organized by its 
policyholders. 
Stock Company: A company which is organized for 
the purpose of making profits for its stockholders. 
Admitted Assets: Total assets as reported to the 
various state insurance departments. Items not in accord 
with state laws or departmental regulations are excluded. 
Surplus: The excess of admitted assets over 
liabilities. 
Stockholder's Eguity: Book value (capital, sur-
plus and voluntary reserves) plus various other items (where 
applicable) such as estimated values of life insurance in 
force. 
C. Historical Development. 
From the middle ·of the nineteenth century, when 
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many of today 1 s large companies were organized, up to the 
present, the·life insurance industry has grown at a rapid 
pace. Numerous publications .detail the many important 
events that shaped the course of this growth. Many im-
provements over the early types of policies were forced 
by the strenuous competition among the companies. Other 
changes were brought about through the action of regula-
tory a~thorities. 
Other than the statistics of growth in such 
areas as insurance in force, assets, number of policy-
holders, etc., the events of the past, that may easily 
have the greatest effect on the future, are those which in-
fluenced the development of the body of laws and regulations 
under which the industry functions. Two such events stand 
out above all others; the Armstrong Investigation and the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision holding insurance to be com-
merce. 
The end of the nineteenth century was a period 
of particularly rapid growth; a growth that was accom-
panied by certain unfavorable developments such as a variety 
of superficially attractive new policies, excessive com-
missions to agents and the deferred dividend plan. The 
growing size and financial influence of the companies, plus 
evidence of some extravagance in management, brought mis-
givings in the public mind, culminating in an order for a 
complete investigation by the legislature of the state of 
20 
New York. This study, known as the Armstrong Investigation, 
covered four areas: organization and control of companies, 
investment and financial operations, expenses, and divi-
dends and the cost of insurance to policyholders. The 
recommendations of the investigating committee resulted in 
a complete revision of the New York insurance laws and in-
directly of those in many other states. These laws com-
pletely revolutionized the operations of life insurance 
companies and brought forth a new era in the industry. Al-
though some of the changes were ill-ad~ised and have since 
been modified, most of them were very beneficial. The in-
vestigation indicated that the companies were basically 
sound both as to operations and financial conditions. It 
definitely resulted in a strengthening of the state regu-
latory authorities and further steps toward more effective 
cooperation among the various states. The immediate effect 
of the adverse publicity during the investigation was a 
substantial reduction in new business. After approximately 
two years of consolidation, growth resumed and has con-
tinued practically without interruption up to the present 
time. 
On June 5, 1944 the Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled in the case of the United States vs. South-
eastern Underwriters Association that the U.S. Constitution 
gives Congress the power, under the commerce clause, to 
21 
regulate insurance when conducted across state lines. 
Prior decisions had always upheld the status of state laws 
and an effective system of supervision had bden developed 
by the states. After considerable agitation, Congress de-
clared that continued regulation by the states was in the 
public intarest. The effect of the court's decision on the 
actual regulation of the companies consists mostly of their 
liability to prosecution under the federal anti-trust laws, 
but the full impact of the decision lies more in its threat 
for the future than in the present. The groundwork has 
been laid and the investor must now keep in mind that, at 
any time it so desires, Congress may by majority vote pre-
empt state control and bring the entire insurance industry 
under federal regulation. Although federal control would 
have some advantages such as reduced duplication and in-
creased uniformity, most life insurance companies are 
strongly in favor of continued state regulation. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMPETITION 
Stock life insurance companies face competition 
from several different sources and of varying degrees of 
importance. Most of it will continue to grow, but only in 
certain instances does this competition represent a potential 
threat to the life insurance industry, or to specific stock 
life companies. 
A. Other Forms of Life Insurance and Investments. 
There are four types of life insurance offering 
competition: fraternal life insurance, savings bank life 
insurance, veterans life insurance and social security. 
Fraternal life insurance is based on the furnishing of life 
insurance benefits to their members by fraternal benefit 
societies. They had their greatest period of growth just 
prior to the end of the last century but were dealt a 
severe blow by the introduction of group insurance in the 
1920's. Since the depression of the 1930's, they have 
grown very slowly and even no~ represent only 2.5% of total 
life insurance in force in this country. 
Savings bank life insurance is available only in 
the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York. 
This insurance is sold by mutual savings banks on an over-
the-counter basis, or by mail and without the use of agents. 
It provides limited amounts of low cost coverage based 
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primarily on savings in expenses. In each state, a central 
organization furnishes actuarial, medical and other services 
to the member banks. Due to small amounts of insurance in 
force, mortality fluctuations may be large and, to reduce 
this, the member banks in each state are allowed to average 
their mortality. Insurance in force in the three states has 
more than doubled since 1947, but at $1,062 million this is 
still only 0.2% of total life insurance in force. In Massa-
chusetts, where it has been available since 1907, it re-
presents slightly more than 4% of total life insurance in 
force in the state. Thus, although steady growth is likely 
to continue, savings bank life insurance will, undoubtedly, 
remain relatively insignificant. 
Governmental insurance programs such as Social 
Security and insurance £or servicemen and veterans are 
easily the most important other forms of insurance competing 
against the life insurance industry. National Service Life 
Insurance issued to servicemen during World War II reached 
a total of $121.3 billion in 1944 when private life insur-
ance in force was only $149.1 billion. However, a high 
lapse rate reduced the total to $34.2 billion in 1946. From 
1950 through 1956 each serviceman received gratuitous cov-
erage o£ $10,000 life insurance which could only be converted 
to renewable term insurance after separation from active 
duty. This form of insurance actually aided the private in-
dustry, because of its educational effect in acquainting 
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people with the benefits of life insurance. Since January 
1, 1957 all servicemen and their dependents have been in-
corporated into the Social Security old-age and survivor's 
benefits. Although there is still a considerable amount of 
government life insurance in force, it will be a declining 
factor. Thus, the fears of many, that such insurance would 
retard the growth of the private life insurance industry, 
have proved groundless. 
The Social Security Act, as passed in 1935 and 
amended frequently since then, also aroused fears of inter-
ference with private life insurance. It is generally con-
ceded that such has not been the case. The act, as referred 
to here, provides retirement, survivorship and disability 
benefits. Other provisions included in the act do not 
offer direct competition to private insurance. The various 
.amendments have gradually extended coverage to more persons 
so that now over 90% of the gainfully employed are covered. 
Private life insurance paid out $2.7 billion in death bene-
fits in 1957, while survivorship .benefits under the Social 
Security Act reached $1.7 billion in that year. Living 
benefits excluding policy dividends were $2.7 billion under 
private insurance in 1957, while old-a.ge and disability 
benefits under the Social Security Act were $7.4 billion. 
In 1958 total benefits excluding policy dividends were $5.8 
billion as compared to $8.6 billion paid out through the 
Social Security program. 
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In spite of its tremendous growth, there is a 
certain amount of dissatisfaction with the present plan of 
Social Security. Benefits are aimed at meeting the minimum 
needs of retired or disabled workers and their survivors, 
and yet they do not even meet these needs. Increased bene-
fits have failed to keep up with the steadily increasing 
cost of living. The Social Security Act is generally 
looked on as a base upon which to build adequate protection 
through such other sources as private life insurance. It 
has done much to make the public security conscious and to 
that extent has acted as an incentive to many people to 
supplement their social security benefits with additional 
private coverage. Thus, to date, the Social Security Act 
has been beneficial to private life insurance. 
The most important question to the investor is 
also the most difficult one to answer: This is the ques-
tion of its effect in the future. Dissatisfaction with 
the present benefits under the Social Security Act will 
almost certainly result in an increase in benefits. The 
trend toward increased assumption of broader social respon-
bility by the federal government is definitely clear and is 
not likely to be reversed. The investor must realize that 
there is the possibility that, at some time in the future, 
the government will have an increased its provisions for 
the care and security of the individual, that the need for 
private insurance will be greatly reduced. Although this 
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will probably not happen within the foreseeable future, it 
is a distinctly unfavorable possibility that must be taken 
into consideration. 
The life insurance industry has, in recent years, 
been faced with renewed competition in the investment area. 
This res.ul ts from the general inflationary tendency of the 
economy during this period which many people believe re-
duces the attraction of life insurance as a medium for in-
vestment. Conversely, the attraction of equity investments 
has increased with the most notable bene:fjiciary being the 
open end mutual funds. 
· The .tremendous growth of mutual funds can be docu-
mented with reams of statistics. The vociferous complaints 
of life insurance salesmen also attest to this growth and 
the competition that has resulted between the rival sales 
forces. The question that is most vital to the investor, 
however, is the future trend of this competition. The an-
swer to this is to be found not in the two industries but 
in the possible future course of inflation. Thus, if the 
economy undergoes a period of severe protracted recession 
or depression, mutual funds would probably lose much of 
their attraction and their competitive force would be great-
ly diminished. If, on the other hand, the inflationary 
trend continues, or even accelerates, then the competition 
between the two forms of saving would increase in intensity. 
This would not be a favorable development relative to the 
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future growth of life insurance companies. 
B. Within the Life Insurance Industry. 
One of the better indications of the degree of 
competition within the life insurance industry is found in 
the rapid increase in the number of companies in the field. 
The 1,314 companies in business at mid-year 1958 represented 
a 10'2% increase over year-end 1950. At the end of 1958, 
there were, approximately, 1,375 legal reserve life companies 
in this country. A large amount of this growth has taken 
place in southern and western areas whose companies numbered 
nearly 1,000 at mid-1958. Texas alone claimed 323 companies 
at this time. Most of those new firms are quite small and 
often have limited financial resources. In many states, it 
is relatively easy to start a life insurance company, par-
ticularly if all business is written within that state. 
Some of these new companies will, eventually, disappear 
through merger, consolidation or even liquidation. During 
this battle for survival, competition will grow steadily 
more intense. There will probably also continue to be new 
companies entering the field unless certain of the more lax 
states take steps to make it considerably more difficult 
to organize a life insurance company. 
One of the more interesting developments is the 
entrance of non-life companies into the field either through 
the organization of new life insurance subsidiaries or 
through the purchase of a controlling interest in companies 
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already in the field. This has taken two forms: the 
numerous cases where fire and casualty companies have en-
tered the life insurance field and the less frequent cases 
where companies completely foreign to any kind of insurance 
have also expanded into life insurance. Among the better-
known examples of the latter are, Sears Roebuck & Co. with 
its All-state division and Tennessee Gas ~ransmission whose 
wholly owned subsidiary Tennessee Life Insurance Company 
paid its parent corporation $1.7 million in dividends in 
1958 and $2.2 million in 1959. 
The entrance of fire and casualty companies is 
not only an attempt to generate increased profits, but is 
also an attempt to offset their unstable and fluctuating 
earnings with the relatively more stable earnings of the 
life insurance business. Among the more recent develop-
ments have been the merging of Monarch Life Insurance Co. 
into Springfield Fire and Marine and Columbian National 
Life Insurance Co. into Hartford Fire. The Life Insurance 
Company of North America, controlled by the Insurance Com-
pany of North America, in its first full year of operation 
(1958) already ranked in the top 10 percent of life in-
surance companies in the United States on the basis of new 
ordinary business placed in force. A fire and casualty 
company provides the life company with a greatly expanded 
sales force already in existance and on the job. These 
agents, after intensive training, are able to offer a 
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complete line of insurance to prospective buyers. If the 
expansion of fire and casualty companies into life insurance 
continues, as seems likely, there must, inevitably, be a 
much tougher competitive battle for new sales. At the pre-
sent time, life companies are prevented by state regulations 
from moving into the fire and casualty field. Even, if pos-
sible, many life companies would not do so unless the 
ability to sell multiple lines appeared to be an absolute 
necessity for continued growth. 
Due to the provisions relating to financial re-
sources in most state laws, practically all new life insur-
ance companies are formed as stock companies. After they 
are well-established and have built up their assets, some 
of these stock companies may later nmutualize." At mid-
1958, 88% of all life companies were stock companies. How-
ever, mutual companies accounted for 62% of total life 
insurance in force. Obviously, the great bulk of the stock 
companies are extremely small and would be of little inter-
est to the investor except under special circumstances. 
One question that is important, however, concerns the re-
lative growth rates of stock and mutual companies. One 
writer compared the 20 largest stock companies to the entire 
industry as to growth in life insurance in force, life in-
surance written and assets for the period 1929-1954. 5 
For stock companies, life insurance in force increased by 
369%, life insurance written by 195%, and assets by 551%. 
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The corresponding rates of increase for the entire industry 
were 232%, 171%, and 381%, respectively. 
The percentage of total life insurance in force 
held by stock life companies has been slowly increasing since 
the end of World War II. 6 In 1945, 30% was with stock com-
panies whereas, at the end of 1958, the stock companies had 
increased their share to 38%. Merely maintaining their 
share of the business at the 1958 level would afford room 
for considerable growth for the stock companies and this 
should represent the minimum possible achievement. 
Brief mention should also be made of the already 
intense competition among life insurance companies. Most 
of the companies or their personnel belong to numerous 
trade organizations, such as the Life Insurance Agency 
Management Association, National Association of Life Under-
writers, Life Office Management Association, etc. On many 
questions affecting the industry, the companies present a 
united front. The big exceptions recently have been the 
new tax law and the variable annuity plans. There is, 
however, no dearth of competition between companies. This 
is attested to by the constant struggle to cut costs- in 
order to keep premium rates down, the drive to pay valid 
claims in the minimum amount of time and the recent advent 
of new types of policies such as family income. Along an-
other line, there is a never-ending search by every company 
for·new agents, whether from outside the industry or from 
31 
other cempanies. There appears to be every indication that 
this competition will grow even stronger in the foreseeable 
future. The result will be a moderate increase in pressure 
on profit margins, but such pressure will not be spread 
evenly throughout the companies. Therefore, it will be im-
perative for the investor to be highly selective. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE SALES 
OF LIFE INSURANCE 
Continued growth in sales of new life insurance 
can come from two sources: increasing the number of people 
insured and increasing the amount of coverage held by each 
insured. The former, frequently called expansive growth, 
is based on population growth and the percentage of that 
population which is insured. The latter, known as intensive 
growth, is based more on the growth of this country's economy. 
A. Population and Economic Growth. 
Without question, sales of life insurance have 
been aided greatly by the booming postwar economy in this 
country, as have most other industries. The measure of 
this growth that is vital to life insurance is disposable 
income. In 1945, life insurance per family and disposable 
personal income per family were both the same, $3,200. By 
195S, life insurance coverage had increased to $8,800. per 
family, while disposable income was then $5,600. The ratio 
of premiums (excluding accident and health) to disposable 
personal income in 1958 was only 3.9%. This ratio shows 
only slight increase since 1943, when it was 3.3% and is 
actually considerably less than the decade of the 30's when 
it averaged 6.0%. If the industry only maintains the pre-
sent ratio, the anticipated continued improvement in 
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disposable personal income would result in substantially 
greater sales of life insurance. 
There appears to be room also for an increase in 
the ratio of premiums to disposable personal income. This 
is borne out by the fact that at $8,800, life insurance per 
family represents only 19 months• disposable income. Thus, 
from approximately one year•s income in 1945, the industry 
has gained only enough to place it at the same relative 
point as in 1930 when life insurance per family was $2,800, 
and disposable personal income per family was $1,900. 
Changing conditions in the economy have generally 
favored the life insurance industry in the past and will 
probably continue to do so, although there are several 
distinct threats which will be considered below. Among the 
favorable factors other than the general growth of the econ-
omy are such items as federal income taxes and inheritance 
taxes. Because proceeds are generally not taxable as in-
come to the beneficiary, life insurance enables an insured 
to provide adequate income for his beneficiaries. High 
individual taxes combined with low returns on investments 
have also made it more difficult to build up an estate 
through regular investment mediums. Increasing urbanization, 
with its attendent loss of the security afforded by farm 
life, has aided life insurance. Mortality improvements 
resulting in expansion of lower and upper age brackets mean 
increased dependents. This provides additional incentives 
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for adequate life insurance protection. Increasing college 
graduates and home ownership are other favorable factors. 
The life insurance industry's record of prompt payment of 
obligations has increased public confidence in the industry 
and combined with an aggressive sales force, new policies 
and new forms of life insurance has enabled the industry to 
capitalize on its favorable position. 
The rapid increase in the population of the 
United States in recent years requires no emphasis. Since 
1900, the greatest growth in life insurance has resulted 
from increasing the percent of the total population insured 
from about 13% to over 70% even as the total population was 
increasing. Obviously, the industry cannot expect a con-
tinuation of gains from this source at the same rate. 
Conditions previously cited as being favorable for intensive 
growth should also result in moderate growth in the percent 
of the total population insu~ed. Expansive growth in the 
future will stem primarily from increases in the total 
population. Projections of the population of this country 
for the year 2,000 are currently in the area of 300 million 
people. This population increase combined with only mod-
erate increase in the percent insured would provide ample 
opportunity for continued growth in life insurance sales. 
The 'investor should also remember that estimates of popula-
tion growth in past years have been consistently below the 
actual result. 
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B. Future Armed Conflict. 
Among the factors which will influence future 
sales of life insurance are the possibilities of war and of 
inflation. Previous wars have had practically no effect on 
the growth of life insurance in the United States. This is 
largely due to the combination of a lack of involvement on 
the part of our civilian population and a relatively low 
level of losses in combatant personnel considering the num-
bers involved. The effect of the two world wars may even 
have been favorable, due to the educational aspects of the 
government life insurance programs, but this might be off-
set by low investment earnings resulting from abnormally 
low interest rates during the wars. 
The effect of any future war on the life insurance 
industry is very difficult to estimate. To a great extent 
it depends on the scope and intensity of the conflict. 
There is a possibility that the industry might be completely 
destroyed either through insolvency resulting from catas-
trophic losses or from the defeat of this country by another. 
Even if we assume that the industry survives, it would al-
most certainly be severely damaged by any global action 
involving atomic or hydrogen weapons. Such relatively 
minor events as destruction of records, dispersal of facili-
ties, increased taxes and financing the war through low in-
terest rates would all have a deterrant effect on the 
industry. It is conceivable that the entire population 
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might be so involved that the federal government would as-
sume the responsibility of insuring a large portion of the 
population, making private life insurance less desireable. 
The investor should remember, however, that the life in-
surance industry, as a medium for investment, might still 
be in just as good a position as any other industry or form 
of investment. 
C. Inflationary Trends. 
In considering the possible effects of inflation 
on the life insurance industry, cartain facts concerning 
the industry are very important. All possible future 
claims against companies are known and fixed as to dollar 
amount. New business represents a small percentage of total 
income. Therefore, it is difficult to increase income by 
raising premium rates. At the same time, general expenses 
would be increased by inflationary pressure, thus placing 
the companies in a squeeze between rising costs and rela-
tively stable income. The importance of expense control 
becomes quite obvious. Any attempt to hedge against in-
flation by increasing investment in assets such as common 
stocks is prevented by regulation, and if inflation is ac-
companied by low interest rates, then investment earnings 
would be low and profits reduced. 
The record of the industry shows that it has not 
been hurt by moderate inflation and, in fact, may have been 
helped by it. Effective expense control has offset rising 
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prices and prevented a~y drastic cost squeeze. As the pur-
chasing power of the dollar has declined, people have 
increased their coverage in order to maintain, or even in-
crease their real protection. This has been particularly 
true of the two inflationary periods in the United States 
following the world wars. 
The effect of more rapid inflation, however, would 
probably be much more serious. Developments in countries 
such as Germany, Austria and France, after World War I, 
provide excellent examples. The German life insurance in-
dustry actually survived the war,. but then succumbed in the 
uncontrolled inflation that followed. Assets of companies 
in the other countries declined drastically. The life 
companies were unable to offset rapidly rising costs 
through either increased premiums or changes in investment 
policy. 
It seems likely that the crux of the situation 
lies in the degree of public confidence in the institution 
of life insurance and in the stability of the currency. In 
the United States, people have never been convinced that 
inflation was inevitable or that the dollar must continue 
to decline in value indefinitely. Therefore, it has never 
lost confidence in life insurance as a means of providing 
either future protection or future income. Because the 
people have not lost this confidence, the record of the 
industry in the past during periods of moderate inflation 
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loses some of its significancd. It is the opinion of the 
writer that, if the people do become convinced that infla-
tion is inevitable, the life insurance industry will be in 
for difficult times. The degree of difficulty will increase 
as the rapidity of inflation increases. At the very least, 
purchases of life insurance for savings would suffer as 
people concentrated on maintaining their protection. As 
the speed at which the dollar depreciates increases, the 
trend away from life insurance would also increase. If a 
moderate degree of inflation continues in this country for 
the foreseeable future, as many economists now predict, it 
will be increasingly difficult to prevent this loss of 
confidence. Thus, in spite of its record in previous peri-
ods of moderate inflation, this factor represents a definite 
obstacle to future sales growth and economic well-being in 
the life insurance industry. 
The continued expansion of the American economy 
and the rising population of this country are very favor-
able factors pointing toward further sales growth in the 
life insurance industry. The outbreak of a major nuclear 
war and increasingly rapid inflation are possibilities 
whose occurrence may be more doubtful, but whose effect 
would be quite disastrous. War and inflation are very de-
finite uncertainties clouding the future of the life in-
surance industry. 
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CHAPTER V 
SOURCES OF INCOME 
All life insurance companies submit annual state-
ments to their respective state insurance commissions on a 
Convention Blank adopted by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners in 1951. Included in this state-
ment is a summary of operations which resembles the income 
statements found in the annual reports of companies in other 
industries. Prior to the adopt~on of this form, life in-
surance companies did not report any figure that even 
closely resembled net income or earnings. This analysis is 
based on the summary of operations and will consider the 
factors which affect the final result and their significance 
to the investor. 
In a condensed form, the table below reveals the 
income and outgo of life insurance company funds on a per-
centage basis. Income is received, primarily, from two 
sources: premium payments by policyholders and earnings on 
investments. It is then used to meet policyholder obli-
gations, operating expenses, taxes and dividends to stock-
holders. The latter, obviously, covers only stock companies, 
while all other data is for the entire industry. Therefore, 
the percent of the income dollar used for dividends is 
necessarily very small. 
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Table I. Life Insurance Company Dollar 
Income: 
Premiums 
Net Invest. Earns. & Other 
(Before Fed. Inc. Tax) 
How· Used: 
Policyholder Obligations 
Benefit Payments 
Add. to Policy Res. 
Add. to Special Res. 
and Surplus 
Operating Expenses 
Agent's Commissions 
H.O. & Other Expense 
Taxes 
Dividends to Stockholders 
79.8¢ 
20.2 
100.0¢ 
50.8¢ 
23.6 
2.9 
77.3 
7.8 
10.1 
17.9 
4.0 
.8 
100.0¢ 
Source: Institute of Life Insurance. 
81.4¢ 
18.6 
100.0¢ 
46.1¢ 
30.1 
4.2 
80.4 
7.7 
9.2 
16.9 
2.0 
.7 
100.0¢ 
81.7¢ 
18.3 
100.0¢ 
43.7¢ 
32.4 
4.3 
80.4 
7.9 
9.1 
~l7.o 
1.9 
.7 
100.0¢ 
In essence, this breakdown reflects the action of 
the three factors affecting the cost of life insurance to 
a policyholder: death rate, interest earnings and the cost 
of doing business. 
A. Premium Income and Insurance in.Force. 
Approximately 80% of the total income of life 
insurance companies is derived from the payment of pre-
miums. These premiums may be for new business, or for re-
newals. They may be for any of several different types of 
contracts and they involve either participating or 
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non-participating policies. Although variations certainly 
exist from one company to another, analysts generally con-
sider some types of contracts more profitable than other 
types. The same can be said for non-participating insurance 
as opposed to participating. These and many other factors 
are important to the investor because they aid him in de-
termining the increase in profit that will result from an 
additional dollar in premiums. 
The annual statement which each company is required 
to file includes a gain and loss exhibit with a breakdown by 
fuines of business. Actually, this is a refinement of the 
summary of operations as it represents a summary for each 
line of business. It then becomes an ~asy matter for the 
investor to determine what type of business each company 
emphasizes. For instance, annual statements reveal the fol-
lowing breakdown for two representative companies in 1958. 
Table ~I.Distribution of 1958 Premiums --
Selected Companies 
Line of Business Conn. General Franklin 
Ordinary Life 32% 90% 
Ordinary Annuities 1 7 
Industrial 
Group Life 14 
Group Annuities 20 
Accident & Health 31 
Other 2 3 
Source: Company Annual Statements. 
Life 
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In 1958, Connecticut General emphasized group 
insurance, while Franklin Life wrote almost exclusively 
ordinary insurance. The writing of individual insurance is 
generally considered to be more profitable than group in-
surance, and ordinary insurance is more profitable than in-
dustrial insurance. Premiums earned in 1958 for Connecticut 
General and Franklin Life represented percentage increases 
over 1948 of 198% and 214% respectively. Thus, premium 
growth is nearly equal for these two companies over this 
span of years although Connecticut General is starting from 
a much larger base. 
The investor should also determine whether there 
has been any shift in emphasis in recent years. In other 
words, has Connecticut General concentrated on group busi-
ness for a good many years, or is this a new development? 
Establishing an organization to administer group insurance 
can be quite costly and may involve substantial losses in 
early years. This can be determined both by reviewing 
prior year's statements and by analyzing data on life in-
surance in force. It takes a considerable period of time 
to build up any substantial amount of life insurance in 
force, but in the case of Connecticut General the.annual 
statement shows that over 60% of its business is in group 
insurance. Since 1948, group insurance in force has in-
creased 347% as compared to a 146% increase for ordinary. 
In 1948, the company's insurance in force was split 
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approximately even between ordinary and group. This means 
that the rapid growth of group has probably been profitable 
and has not been burdened with the high costs of entering a 
new line of business. 
A similar analysis should be made of any company 
under consiaeration. The distribution of life insurance in 
force over.a p~riod of years should be studied to detect 
any possibl.e shifts in emphasis. With most companies the 
distribution pattern would change very slowly from year to 
year, because additions to insurance in force for one year 
are small, relative to _the total life insurance in force. 
Therefore, it is necessary to use data covaring a period 
of several years; usually five or more. This information 
combined with recent data.on premiums written should reveal 
the direction in which a company is headed. 
Tablei]Iindicates that group insurance has con-
tributed an increasing ,portion of total life insurance in 
force. This does not mean that ordinary and industrial are 
not expanding. They are merely growing at a slower rate. 
The investor must also remember that group insurance, al-
though it has sho'vn more rapid growth, is generally less 
profitable than ordinary insurance. 
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Table ~liDistribution of Life Insurance 
in Force in the United States 
Year Ordinary Group Industrial 
-
1958 58% 29% 8% 
1957 58 29 9 
1956 58 28 10 
1953 61 24 13 
1950 64 21 14 
1945 67 14 18 
1940 68 13 18 
Other 
5% 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Spectator Year Book and Institute of Life 
Insurance. 
The growth of life insurance in force for each company pro-
vides a measure of company growth, but it is of limited 
use due to the great variation in earnings on different 
types of contracts. Life insurance in force in the United 
States increased 145% between 1948 and 1958, but ordinary 
insurance in force increased only 119%. It is important 
to know whether a company is inc~easing its insurance in 
force, but this is relatively less important than knowing. 
what type of insurance is increasing, as has been discussed 
previously. 
Another important factor related to premium in-
come is the average size policy a company sells. The 
profitability of a policy should increase as its face 
value increases, because the cost of iasuance and adminis-
tration does not increase at the same rate as the p.remium. 
The average ordinary policy for the industry has risen 
from $2,820 in 1948 to $5,740 at the end of 1958. 
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A relatively rapid increase in a company's average size 
policy should have a favorable effect on future earnings. 
It is important also to determine the cancellation 
rate of insurance alre~dy sold, or its persistancy. A heavy 
rate of early cancellations on policies means that the com-
pany has made the initial high expenditure required for a 
new policy, but will not be able to recoup this amount 
through the collection of future premiums. Both the aver-
age size policy and the persistancy of a company's policies 
can be readily determined from .the exhibit of insurance 
policies in each company's annual statement. 
At year-end 1958, 68% of all life insurance in 
force was participating. This dovetails neatly with the 
fact that 62% of all life insurance in force was held by 
mutual companies. Stock life insurance companies prefer 
to write non-participating insurance, although many write 
some participating insurance, also. Competition is the 
primary r_eason that stock companies write any participating 
business at all. Life insurance agents realize that many 
people prefer such policies. Therefore, a company selling 
both types of insurance should not only sell more policies 
but should also find it easier to attract good agents. 
Non-participating insurance is generally con-
sidered to be more profitable for the companies. According 
to one well-known analyst, " •••• participating business is 
less than half as profitable as non-participating insurance, 
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the exact amount varying :from company to company.n7 
Profits on participating insurance are limited in many 
states. In New York, the stockholders are restricted to 
10% of the participating profits or 50 cents per thousand 
dollars o:f participating insurance in :force, whichever is 
larger. In spite of their lower profitability, participating 
policies offer additional advantages. On a given amount o:f 
capital funds, more participating business can be written 
than non-participating, due to the higher gross premiums. 
Policyholders frequently leave their dividends with the 
company and part of the income earned on these funds will 
accrue to tpe stockholders. 
Thus, the investor must realize that just as in-
formation on total sales for an industrial company may 
cover a wide variety of products of varying degrees of 
profitability, premium income covers many different types 
of contracts. These contracts each contribute toward the 
determination of net gain from operation, but also in 
varying degrees. 
B. Investment Income and Assets. 
As we have seen in Chapter II, the insurance in-
dustry is based on the level premium plan. Because the 
probability of death increases with age, the insured is 
actually paying more than would be required to meet claims 
in the early years of the policy and less in the later. 
To keep this level premium as low as possible, the companies 
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must invest these "excess" payments so that interest earned 
will bridge the gap between claim payments and premiums re-
ceived. Because of this fundamental position of investment 
income, the investment policies of the companies become ex-
tremely important to the investor. 
The nature of the life insurance industry is such 
that the importance of certain influencing factors should 
be readily apparent. This includes those applicable to 
the investment of any large sum of money and those peculiar 
to the life insurance industry. Life insurance exists pri-
marily to provide security for the survivors of the insured. 
Inability to make claim payments would mean the end of the 
industry. Thus, safety of principal which results in con-
servative investment policies must take precedence over all 
other objectives. 
Supporting this use of conservative investment 
policies are certain other factors. The contingency in-
sured against is certain to occur. It is also fixed as to 
dollar amount, which means that rising claims due to infla-
tion are not a threat. In addition, life companies operate 
under rather thin margins of capital and surplus. As 
equities of even the highest caliber may show relatively 
large fluctuations in price, a company heavily committed 
to equities might find its holdings decreased to such an 
extent that capital and surplus would be endangered. This 
tendency toward relatively conservative investment policies 
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has also been encouraged by the regulatory authorities of 
the various states. 
Historically, life insurance companies have had 
only minor problems in regard to liquidity. Premium and 
investment income have exceeded total cash requirements in 
every year. Most companies have never had to liquidate in-
vestments to obtain cash. This means that the companies 
are really long-term investors. The result can be a higher 
rate of return due to long-term interest rates. They need 
to maintain only sufficient liquidity to take advantage of 
changing investment conditions. Liquidity would become a 
problem in the future if the industry slowed its growth 
drastically, but this does not appear to be of immediate 
concern. 
The large amounts of money available to life com-
panies create problems with which the ordinary investor is 
totally unfamiliar. The effect of investing such large 
sums with safety, so as to obtain adequate income, exerts 
a downward pressure on interest rates. Thus, the companies 
are to some extent caught between their need to invest 
their funds and the lower rates which this investment 
causes. 
Until 1959, the industry was aided considerably 
by its favored and unique tax situation. Taxes were based 
solely on investment income with no account being taken of 
underwriting profits. Although the tax situation is 
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treated in detail in chapter VI, section D, it is important 
to note that the effective rate was so low that life com-
panies were, in general, not attracted to tax-exempt 
municipal bonds unless for reasons other than yield. The 
new tax law raises taxes and will result in some changes in 
company investment policies, but the industry is still in 
a favored position. 
The investment policies of life insurance companies 
are influenced strongly by the fact that the industry is 
regulated by the various states. Each company must comply, 
at least substantially, with the regulations of each state 
in which it does business. All companies, except those 
operating in only one or a few states, are affected most 
strongly by the laws of the largest states, particularly 
those with the strictest regulations. This is very evident 
when considering the large national companies doing business 
in the state of New York, whether domiciled there or not. 
New York has, for years, been a leader in the development 
of regulatory procedures. An example was the far-reaching 
effect of the Armstrong Investigation. Most of the regu-
lations in the various states were initially established 
in the leading states such as New York and Massachusetts, 
and then adopted by the others. 
The regulations of the states take two principal 
forms: authorization of the amounts and types of invest-
ments that may be made and the establishment of minimum 
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standards to be met by any security before it will be con-
sidered a legal investment. The types of investments are 
generally divided into the following classes: U.S. govern-
ment bonds, state bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, 
real estate mortgages, policy loans, corporate bonds, real 
estate and corporate stock. Limitations of the amounts 
that may be purchased in any one class are either non-
existent, or very liberal for the various types of govern-
ment bonds. However, they become very strict for the two 
types of investment that involve ownership, i.e. real estate 
and corporate stock. Most states limit the companies to a 
small percentage of their assets that may be invested in 
common stock. This ranges from zero to ten percent. There 
has been a definite trend in recent years to raise the al-
lowable percentage of assets that companies may invest in 
common stocks. Another liberalizing development has been 
establishment of an unrestricted class of investments. The 
percentage allowed is, however, quite small. 
The establishment of minimum standards to be met 
for each investment applies most heavily in the area of 
the various corporate securities. In the case of corporate 
bonds, this usually takes the form of a minimum number of 
times the earnings of the company must cover fixed charges 
and for a stated number of years. There are also limita-
tions that prevent an insurance company from acquiring 
undue influence in the affairs of any corporation through 
51 
its ownership of bonds or stocks. The standards estab-
lished for common stocks and real estate are even stricter 
than those for corporate bonds. In fact, some states do 
not permit ownership of any of these obligations and many 
others have only recently done so. 
The significance of the state regulations lies 
not so much in their specific terms or content but in the 
general effect they have on investment policy. The regula-
tions support the conservative principles followed by all 
responsible life insurance companies. They attempt to 
legislate the very ideas that the companies would, in general, 
follow, anyway. Because of the fiduciary nature of the in-
dustry, this i~, undoubtedly, beneficial. The policyholder 
knows that there is a legal limitation on speculative ex-
cess by any company that tended to be financially irre-
sponsible. There has, bbviously, been tremendous growth 
in the industry whether because of or in spite of the regu-
latory authorities. 
The principal disadvantage of the investment 
regulations is 'the resulting lack of flexibility. It is 
certainly conceivable that the industry could obtain a 
higher rate of return without any damage to the safety of 
its principal if allowed more flexibility in its invest-
ments. Major changes in regulations come only after long-
drawn-out hearings before insurance and legislative 
commissions and may not be affected until after the 
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favorable opportunity has passed. However, there has been 
a definite trend toward further liberalization in recent 
years and this appears likely to continue, although changes 
will occur only very gradually. 
There is a possibility that the limitation of 
equity capital may actually be damaging to the growth of 
the overall economy, but this lies in the realm of specu-
lation and would be extremely difficult to prove. 
The mas~ important idea for the investor to keep 
in mind is that the regulatory authorities cannot guarantee 
the effectiveness of a company's investment policies. They 
are only setting minimums to protect the interests of the 
policyholders. 
Investment policy has two· main objectives: to 1 at 
least, equal the average interest rate assumed in the cal-
culation of the company's premium rates and to increase 
the value of its capital. This must be done within the 
limita£ions imposed by the regulatory authorities and the 
general conditions of the industry previously cited. 
Table IV shows that the industry was faced with a 
declining net interest rate earned on invested funds from 
1930 to 1947, but since then there has been a slow, steady 
rise. The low period was caused, primarily, by the finan-
cial policies of the federal government which promoted low 
interest rates, first to stimulate recovery from the de-
pression of the 30's, and then to finance World War II. 
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A combination of factors also forced the companies to pur-
chase an unusually large amount of government obligations 
at these low interest rates. 
Table I~. Net Rate of Interest Earned 
on Invested Funds -- U.S. 
Life Insurance Companies 
!!£ Rate Before Fit Rate After 
1958 3.85 N • .A.. 
1956 3.63 3.33 
1953 3.36 3.15 
1950 3.13 3.00 
1947 2.88 2.88 
1945 3.11 3.05 
1942 3.44 3.36 
1939 3.54 
1936 3.71 
1933 4.25 
1930 5.05 
Fit 
Source: Institute of Life Insurance. 
In the late 1940's, most companies were issuing 
policies with a low-assumed interest rate. With the sub-
sequent rise in general interest rates, the rate earned on 
investments improved. This development was also aided 
somewhat by the trend to allow the companies more flexi-
bility, so that they could channel additional funds into 
higher yielding securities such as common stocks. 
Excluding the possibility of a severe depres-
sion, it appears likely that interest rates will remain 
high with only temporary drops in periods of business re-
traction. However, there does not seem to be much room for 
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any appreciable rise in the rates. Although the rate of 
interest earned should therefore remain high, there will be 
no spectacular gains such as has been seen in recent years. 
If a company can consistently earn more on its 
investments than is required to maintain its reserves 
(determined by the assumed interest rate), a significant 
contribution can be made to its earnings. The Bank of New 
York states in discussing the period since 1948 that 11 the 
rise in the rate of interest earned combined with reductions 
in the rate of interest assumed for policy reserves has 
been the most important cause of the excellent growth of 
industry earnings.n 8 
A continuance of this contribution to earnings 
appears to be highly improbable for the future. The great 
number of new companies in the field are adding to the al-
ready tight competition for sales. This competitive 
pressure will certainly bring demands for lower premiums 
from agents. One way to do this is to raise the assumed 
interest rate. This will lower premiums and, theoreti-
cally, increase sales, but it will also cut into excess 
interest that has been contributing to net gain. 
An analysis of the percentage distribution of 
its assets should reveal interesting trends and character-
istics about any company. The changes in these percentages 
from year to year should give a good idea of management's 
policies and an indication of possible future action. The 
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companies publish, at the same time as their Annual Reports, 
a Schedule of Securities. ·This shows the quality and di-
versity of the individual holdings that make up the total. 
Some companies may also have assets which their state in-
surance commissions do not recognize as admitted assets. 
However, these non-admitted assets may have a very real 
value to the company. 
Practically all life companies have between 70% 
and 90% of their assets invested in bonds and mortgages, 
but the type of bond will make a large difference in the 
yield. Table t shows the changes over the years of the 
percentage distribution of assets for the industry. 
These figures show conclusively the shift away 
from U.S. Government bonds and the particularly rapid 
growth of holdings of industrial bonds and mortgages. 
The net interest rate earned on invested assets 
is actually defined as the ratio of net investment income 
to mean invested assets at year-end decreased by one half 
the net investment income. The effect of changes in the 
net interest rate earned can be readily shown by multiply-
ing the change in the percentage for the period involved 
by the mean invested assets less one half of net investment 
income for the year to be measured. Thus, if the differ-
ence between the net interest rates earned for 1947 and 
1959 were multiplied by the data for 1959, the investor 
would know how much lower 1959 net investment income would 
be if we returned to the low interest rates of 1947, 
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'l.C\ 
Table V. DistribUtion of Assets of U.S. Life Insurance Companies 
; 
U.S.Govt. St.&Munic. R.R. P.U. Ind. Real 
Year Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Stocks Mtgs. Estate 
1958 6.7% 3.6% 3.6% 14.8% 21.8% 3.8% 34.4% 3.1% 
1957 6.9 3.4 3.8 15.1 21.5 3.3 34.8 3.1 
1956 7.9 3.5 4.0 15.1 20.6 3.7 34.4 2.9 
1955 9.5 3.4 4.3 15.5 20.1 4.0 32.6 2.9 
1950 21.0 4.1 5.0 16.5 14.9 3.3 25.1 2.2 
1945 45.9 4.4 6.6 11.6 4.3 2.2 14.8 1.9 
1940 18.7 8.8 9.2 13.9 5.0 2.0 19.4 6.7 
1935 12.3 8.1 11.3 9.1 2.5 2.5 23.1 8.6 
1930 1.7 6.3 15.5 8.6 1.9 2.8 40.2 2.9 
1920 11.3 7.1 24.3 1.7 0.7 1.0 33.4 2.3 
Source: Spectator Year Book and Institute of Life Insurance. 
Policy 
Loans Other 
3.9% 4.3% 
3.8 4.3 
3.7 4.2 
3.6 4.1 
3.8 4.1 
4.4 3.9 
10.0 6.3 
15.2 7.3 
14.9 5.2 
11.7 6.5 
Earnings from investments do not show wide flue-
tuations as do the interest rates of the various components 
that make up the total investment picture. During the past 
decade, the trend of interest rates has been up, and the 
net interest rate earned on invested assets for life insur-
ance companies has shown a steady rise, but the rates on 
most of the individual types of holdings that are bought and 
sold in the money markets reveal much wider swings as can be 
seen from table VI. 
Table VI. Comparison of Net Interest Rate Earned 
on Invested Ass·ets to other Money Rates 
Net Int. Rate Prime Commercial Corp. Bonds 
~ before FIT Pa:Eer 2 4-6 mos. Aaa-A 
1958 3.85% 2.1/6% 4.16% 
1957 3.75 3.81 4.21 
1956 3.63 3.31 3.57 
1955 3.51 2.18 2.57 
1954 3.46 1.58 2.46 
1953 3.36 2.52 2.82 
Source: Institute of Life Insurance and Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
For instance, columns two and three reflect the 
temporary drop in money rates during the rdcessions of 1954 
and 1958. While these fluctuations, undoubtedly, created 
problems in the investment departments of the life insur-
ance companies, they had little effect on investment 
earnings. As long-term investors primarily in debt obli-
gations, life insurance companies are more effected by the 
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long-term trends of money rates rather than short-term 
fluctuations. 
The breakdown of the life insurance company dollar 
showed net investment income and other income as a single 
item. Other income refers to such items as proceeds re-
tained at death, disability, or upon surrender or maturity 
of a policy: or annuity contract to be settled by a supple-
mentary contract, some of which will include life contin-
gencies. These contracts represent the various optional 
modes of settlement of a policy and, as such, are income 
only of a bookkeeping nature. For example-, money may be 
paid out to a beneficiary as a death benefit. The bene-
ficiary may at the same time elect to receive the funds in 
installments over a certain period of years. Therefore, 
the total death benefit also appears as income to the com-
pany and shows up in future years as a different type of 
benefit payment; payments on supplementary contracts. All 
of this has merely taken place on the books of the company. 
The important point for the investor to remember is that 
this type of income does provide an additional source of 
earnings. It is more of a banking function than an insur-
ance function. 
We have now completed the income portion of the 
Summary of Operations discussing premium, investment and 
other income. The ways in which these funds are used will 
be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
APPLICATION OF INCOME 
A. Benefit Payments. 
As we saw in Table I, approximately 50% of the 
income dollar is used to make benefit payments to policy-
holders and/or beneficiaries. These take the form of 
death benefits, matured endowments, disability payments, 
annuity payments, surrender values, policy dividends and 
• 
health insurance payments. The amount paid out in living 
benefits has consistently exceeded that paid out for death 
benefits. Actually, these payments do not represent en-
tirely cash outgo as part is left with the companies for 
future payment. In 1958, 24% of the death benefits from 
ordinary policies remained with the companies. Of the total 
life insurance benefits, about $800 million was set aside 
for future payment, or about 19% of the funds most likely 
to be used for income purposes. These funds are important 
because they continue to earn interest which normally will 
exceed what the companies would have to pay to the owners. 
As the industry develops new and improved settlement 
options, the tendency should be for the percentage left 
with the companies to increase. 
The rate at which benefit payments have increased 
over the years has not been as great as the gain in insur-
ance in force. This is caused by a combination of several 
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factors including sharply rising sales, which also lowers 
the average age of policyholders. This would mean a lower 
death rate and slow the rate of growth of death benefits. 
As we shall see below, the death rate has also been dropping 
for other reasons. 
In Chapter V, brief mention was made of persistency 
or the degree of success a company has in ke~ping policies 
in. force. The surrender values paid out as benefits repre-
sent the out-of-pocket cost of losing policies already 
written. Additional policies are lapsed, primarily, for 
failure to pay premiums. A valuable measure of the propor-
tion of policies being lapsed or surrendered is the voluntary 
termination rate. This is the ratio of the number of ordi-
nary policies lapsed or surrendered, less reinstatements, 
to the mean number of ordinary policies in force during the 
year. Table VII shows the industry ratio for the years 1951 
through 1958. A comparison of these figures with percentage 
data for individual companies indicates, to some degree, 
the quality of the business going on the books. A company 
with rapidly rising sales could actually be in considerable 
difficulty if the policies were not staying on the books 
long enough to offset any of the high cost of initial ac-
quisition. 
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Table VII. Voluntary Termination Rate 
Ordinary Policies in Force in 
the U.S. 
Policies in Force All Policies 
~ 2 Years or More in Force 
1958 4.0 5.7 
1957 3.9 5.4 
1956 2.8 4.2 
1955 2.5 3.8 
1954 2.6 3.8 
1953 2.2 3.2 
1952 2.2 3.2 
1951 2.2 3.2 
Source: Institute of Life Insurance. 
The rather steady rise in the termination rat·e 
in recent years certainly represents, to some extent, the 
conversion of life insurance into equities. Part of this 
rise in 1957 and 1958 was also caused by the recession 
during that period. At the present time, this shift to 
equities appears to have slowed considerably. However, 
the rise in the voluntary termination rate indicates what 
might happen if policyholders become convinced of the in-
evitability of inflation. 
Fundamental to the course of benefit payments 
and, of even more importance, to the course of earnings, 
is the possibility of future gains in mortality. Ob-
viously, the life insurance industry has been aided, in 
recent decades, by improving mortality experience. The 
steady drop in the death rate of the total population re-
sults from many factors, including tremendous advances in 
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the medical field and a rising standard of living. The 
death rate for life insurance policyholders is even lower 
primarily because most applicants are medically screened 
before iasuance of the policy. Thus, improved medical 
examination procedures and techniques add further impetus 
to gains resulting from other sources. Table VIII serves 
to emphasize the select medical status of the life insurance 
policyholder. 
Table VIII. Death Rate per 1,000 People 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
U.S. Total 
Population 
13.0 
11.7 
11.3 
10.9 
10.8 
10.6 
9.6 
9.3 
9.4 
9.6 
9.5 
U.S. Life Insurance 
Ordinary Policyholders 
7.4 
6.9 
7.1 
7.7 
7.4 
7.9 
6.1 
6.0 
5.8 
6.1 
6.1 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1959 
and Institute of Life Insurance. 
The greatest gains in mortality have been made in 
the younger age groups in recent years. Progress in QUring 
the diseases of the aged has been much slower in spite of 
the large amount of funds being spent on research. The 
importance of these gains in the lower age groups can be 
realized when we consider that 30% of the number of new 
ordinary policies sold in 1956 were on the lives of people 
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under the age of 15 and, by 1958, 59% of the volume of new 
ordinary policies sold on lives over 15 years of age were 
to those between 15 and 34. 9 
The prospects for continued gains in mortality 
appear to be bright when you consider the large sums being 
spent on research and the great successes of the recent 
past. Improvements in the lower age brackets mean that 
more people are reaching old age. Therefore, the greatest 
area of potential gain lies in solving the riddles of those 
diseases affecting older people. Most recent comment from 
people close to the field of medical research has been op-
timistic on the possibilities for major breakthroughs in 
the near future. 
The possibility of future gains in mortality is 
highly important to the investor, because it has a direct 
bearing on future earnings. One of the three vital factors 
affecting the cost of insurance is mortality in that every 
premium is based on several assumptions, one of which is 
the death rate. If the actual death rate is lower than 
that assumed and all other factors remain equal, then 
earnings will increase. This is, primarily, becauxe funds 
that would have been spent in payment of claims remain in-
vested and continue to compound. Premiums are not adjusted 
on policies already in force. They reflect the death rate 
assumed by the mortality table in use at the time they were 
issued. Mortality gains are particularly important to 
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stock companies because they write, primarily, non-
participating insurance. This means that the net premium 
to the policyholders cannot be reduced through increased 
dividends as on a participating policy. 
One method of estimating the effect of changes 
in the death rate on earnings of a company is to relate 
the changes to the payment of death benefits. 10 This 
means multiplying the amount of death benefits paid by the 
percentage change in the death rate. Thus, a 10% reduction 
in the death rate, applied to the total death benefits paid 
in 1958 of $2,909 million, would mean a reduction of about 
$291 million. Due to the broad assumptions that must be 
made in this type of calculation, the amount arrived at is 
only a rough approximation and should only be used to in-
dicate the scope of the savings possible through mortality 
gains. An additional indication of the importance of such 
savings is that this amount of $291 million is equal to 
about 4.7% of unassigned surplus for U.S. life insurance 
companies for the year 1958. 
The distribution of insurance in force reveals 
addit'ional information concerning the impact of changes in 
mortality experience. Companies that emphasize term in-
surance and group insurance rely more heavily on mortality 
gains for their profits. This is becauxe the investment 
feature has been minimized with very little reliance being 
placed on investment income. Thus the possibility of gains 
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from excess interest are relatively less important than 
those from favorable mortality. Considering only mor-
tality, the investor should also remember that what is 
favorable for life insurance policies is unfavorable for 
annuities. Therefore, a relatively large amount of annui-
ties in force would tend to offset, to some extent, a 
company's life insurance policies. 
B. Additions to Reserves. 
The importance of policy reserves in the state-
ments of life insurance companies cannot be overestimated. 
They represent the largest liability on any company's 
balance sheet, reaching sometimes 80% or more of total 
liabilities. From table I, it is apparent that about one 
quarter of each year's total income is added to policy 
reserves. 
In addition to the relatively large amount of 
these funds, they are important for another reason. The 
method by which these funds are handled varies from one 
company to the next. Such items as commissions, operating 
expenses, taxes and the great bulk of benefit payments are 
essentially cash disbursements. Additions to reserves, 
however, are funds set aside to meet the future payments 
of claims and, therefore, become liabilities. The funds, 
themselves, are invested and thus bring into being the 
tremendous assets of the life insurance companies. Based 
on 1958 data, a comparison of policy reserves and assets 
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shows ~hat the former were over 82% as large as total 
assets. 
Changes in the method of accumulating reserves 
will also have an effect on earnings. All other items 
being equal, funds not allocated ~o policy reserves will 
show up as earnings and be added to surplus. Due to the 
different methods of computing policy reserves, reported 
earnings are not readily comparable between companies. 
Thus, it is essential for the investor to know the method 
each company uses in setting up the policy reserves. 
The most conservative method of valuation of 
policy reserves is known as the net level premium method. 
This requires alloca~ing to policy reserves the entire ne~ 
premium (policyholder's premium less ~he loading charge), 
except for the small par~ used to mee~ first year death 
claims. ~owever, a new policy involves certain large non-
recurring expenses. The agent's firs~ year commission is 
approximately 5o% of the annual premium on permanent in-
surance. The home office costs of getting a policy on ~he 
books are also considerably larger than the loading charge. 
Therefore, ~hese early expenses mus~ be met from surplus. 
The net effect of rapid growth under ~his method 
is ~o unders~ate surplus and this is the me~hod used by 
most large well-established companies. They have generally 
preferred to build reserves rather ~han surplus, and any 
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change in ~his method for an older company should be questioned. 
Although large companies may have little diffi-
culty meeting initial heavy policy expenses from surplus, 
newer companies certainly have more difficulty. Lacking 
sufficient surplus, such companies frequently set up their 
reserves on some form of modified preliminary term basis. 
There are several variations of this method, but they all 
involve using part or all of the first year's net premium 
to cover first year expenses and claims. This is then made 
up in future years by adding part of the renewal loadings to 
policy reserves. Eventually, policy reserves for any single 
type of policy would accumulate to about the same amount 
using either the net level or modified preliminary term 
methods. The differences lie, primarily, in the amount of 
the initial addition to reserves and the rate of accumula-
tion. Table IX illustrates these differences for one type 
of policy. The Commissioners Reserve Valuation Method used 
in the illustration is one of the variations of the modified 
preliminary term method that is found in general use by com-
panies not under the net level premium method. 
Thus, companies operating on a net level premium 
basis would tend to understate earnings to a much greater 
degree than those under the various modified methods. The 
net level premium method is not only more conservative, but 
it also means that a greater value must be placed on insur-
ance in force. 
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Table IX. Terminal Reserves on Different 
Valuation Standards -- CSO 2t,%, 
Age: 35, 20-Year Endowment 
Year of Net Level Prem. Comm. Reserve 
Polic;y: Method Valuation Meth. 
1 $ 38.62 $ 12.02 
2 78.13 52.63 
5 202.37 180.30 
10 430.71 414.96 
15 692.04 683.52 
20 1,000.00 1,000.00 
Source: Heubner, S.S. and Black, K.B., Jr.: ~ 
Insurance, New York, 1958. 
Because the amount of insurance in force has a definite 
value for future earnings, most analysts adjust reported 
earnings to reflect this factor. The amount of the adjust-
ment varies according to the reserve method used, and other 
factors. It is discussed more fully in Chapter VII, 
Section A. 
Variations in the amounts added to policy reserves 
may also be caused by certain other factors.. Different in-
terest assumptions can cause considerable difference in 
reserves. If the interest assumption is relatively low, 
then a larger net premium is required to produce larger re-
serves. This would normally result in larger assets for 
investment income, better protection against a future de-
cline in interest rates and allow more flexibility in 
investment policy. There is also the disadvantage that the 
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higher premium might hurt sales of new policies. 
Generally, a company writing on a lower interest 
assumption is going to produce more earnings for its stock-
holders, provided that all other factors remain equal. 
Therefore, when comparing companies, earnings should be ad-
justed for differences in their assumed interest rates. 
Changes in the mortality assumption will also re-
sult in a change in policy reserves. However, the change 
depends on so many factors relative to the type of business 
written by a company that it is extremely difficult to cal-
culate. Most analysts do not attempt to make any adjustment 
for differences in the mortality assumption. 
The investor should be aware of other types of 
reserves found in life insurance company statements. One 
of the more important, especially in recent years, is the 
deficiency reserve. State laws usually require that a de-
ficiency reserve be set up when a company charges a gross 
premium based on its own mortality experience, which is less 
than the net premium required by the standards of the state 
insurance commissioners. The reserves indicate that some 
policies being issued are based on more favorable mortality 
assumptions than the accepted tables contain. These lower 
premiums reduce the size of future profits on new policies. 
The adoption by many companies of the 1958 CSO Table, which 
recognizes improved mortality experiences and permits lower 
premium rates, will reduce or eliminate the need for 
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deficiency reserves. In any event, current mortality ex-
perience indicates that thes~ reserves will not be required 
and, as the policies run out, they will be restored to 
earnings. Therefore, in determining true earnings, defic-
iency reserves should be added to earnings. 
The investor will usually find other reserves 
listed on a life company's statement. One of these, the 
security valuation reserve, is in the nature of a true re~ 
serve and should be included in net capitalization. Due to 
the long-term nature of their business, life insurance com-
panies tend to be overly conservative and set up reserves 
against what may seem to be rather remote contingencies. 
Generally, these reserves are classified as voluntary re-
serves and also added to net capitalization. 
In summarizing this section on reserves, it should 
be obvious that the manner in which reserves are treated has 
a tremendous bearing on the stated earnings of any life in-
surance company. Adjustments to e~rnings to account for 
these differences are, obviously, very important. If these 
are accurately calculated, then comparisons of earnings 
data for different companies will reveal a true picture of 
their relative strength. 
C. Operating Expenses. 
Operating expenses usually include commissions 
and general expenses. In 1958, these two categories to-
gether absorbed 17.9% of total income and, therefore, merit 
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considera~ion by the investor. 
As was discussed in Chap~er II, ~he gross premium 
paid by a purchaser of a life insurance policy includes an 
amoun~ added ~o ~he net premium to cover expenses and ~o 
provide for con~ingencies. This is known as ~he loading and 
is extremely important to mos~ stock companies who issue 
non-par~icipating policies. Stock companies have no oppor-
~uni~y to refund to the policyholdirs any savings resulting 
from reduced operating expenses. Therefore, the amount pro-
vided for loading mus~ .be as accurately calculated as:~possible 
in order to keep premium ra~es competitive and still cover 
operating expenses. 
Inherent in the nature of the life insurance in-
dustry are several other factors that have a direct bearing 
on the impor~ance of opera~ing expenses. The ini~ial cos~ 
of placing new business on the books is much higher ~han. the 
cost of maintaining it in later years. Various expenses 
such as medical examinations, credit reports, policy pre-
paration, and even most of the agent•s commission, are 
incurred only in connection with a new policy. These large 
initial expenses account for the different methods used to 
determine policy reserves. Thus, it should be obvious tha~ 
rapidly-growing companies have a re~l problem in trying ~o 
control their opera~ing expenses. 
Compounding ~he difficulty is ~he fact ~hat life 
insurance companies cannot readily pass higher costs on ~o 
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the 11 consumer 11 in a. manner that would be of any apprec-
iable benefit to the company. This is because premium 
income from new business does not ordinarily represent a. 
very large percentage of total income. Any increase in 
premium rates effects only new business and not renewals 
from which the greater percentage of premium income is de-
rived. This fact plus the competitive pressures in the 
industry mean that companies would be extremely reluctant 
to attempt to pass on higher costs by increasing premiums. 
The alternative, therefore, is to maintain a tight 
rein on expenses by utilizing any and all means available. 
The development of pun~hed card accounting and tabulating 
procedures and, more recently, the high speed electronic 
computers seems to have been almost tailor-made for·the 
life insurance industry. It is, primarily, a paper and 
pencil pushing business and, as such, would have been in 
considerable difficulty if mechanization had not offset the 
increased cost of labor. Rapid growth w.ould soan have re-
sulted in intolerable inefficiencies without mechanization, 
because the only available solution to the accumulation and 
digestion of vast amounts of data would be additional per-
sonnel. Life insurance companies have successfully met this 
problem so far through mechanization. This has meant that 
\ the average clerk can now turn out a greater volume of 
work. From the end of World War II to 1956, life insurance 
personnel increased by 59%, while life insurance in force 
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rose 172%. 11 
Organizational changes have also aided in holding 
down the rise in operating expenses. Many companies have 
set up planning divisions and various types of special staff 
organizations. The development of budgetary control and 
cost analysis techniques has been especially rapid in recent 
years. The value of cost control has been obvious in pro-
duction industries for years, but its acceptance has not 
been general in the life insurance field until more recently. 
Much of this is based on the realization that it is impos-
sible to make valid plans for the future of your company 
without some knowledge of the cost of these plans~ It is, 
also, impossible due iio iihe naiiure of the industry iio make 
a profiii for your stockholders unless costs are kepii under 
control. 
Improved personnel policies have been utilized, 
also. Thus, recruitmenii, seleciiion, placemenii, training 
and evaluation have received increasing emphasis in recent 
years. Siiudies of motivation have been made and utilized 
to help fight one of the industry's greatest problems --
turnover. 
A more recent development in the industry has 
been iihe decentralization of the office staffs. The besii 
example of this is the Prudential Insurance Company which 
has established regional headquarters throughout the country. 
This means thaii much of the detailed work may be handled 
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closer to its source. More important, from the point of 
view of cost control, is that each unit is smaller and, 
therefore, should be easier to control. 
How successful have the companies been in holding 
down their costs? One common means of measurement is the 
expense ratio. This is defined as the ratio of commissions, 
agency expenses, home office salaries, medical fees, rents, 
and all other management expenses to premium income, net 
investment income and all other cash receipts. Put in 
simpler terms, it is the ratio of operating expenses to 
total income. As can be seen from Table X, the record of 
the industry has been quite favorable for many years. 
There has been a slight rise in the most recent decade, but 
it does not appear to have gotten out of hand. The in-
dustry's record in these recent years, in the face of a 
generally rising wage level, must certainly reflect, in 
~ 
part, the success of i~s program of mechanization. Over 
the longer period of years, covered by the Table, there is 
no record of an upward trend. 
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Table X. Ratio of Operating Expenses 
to Total Income 
~ Ra~io ~ Ratio 
1915 16.7% 1948 17.0% 
1920 21.0 1951 16.3 
1925 19.1 1954 16.9 
1930 16.5 1955 16.7 
1935 14.0 1956 17.2 
1940 13.9 1957 17.8 
1945 13.7 1958 17.9 
Source: Spectator Year Book and Institute 
of Life Insurance. 
A further indication of the success the companies 
have had in controlling costs can be seen from.a comparison 
of the number of employees and data on life insurance in 
force. In 1945, one employee was·required for each $581 
thousand of life insurance in force. By 1956, each em-
ployee supported $995 thousand, which is a gain of about 
71%. An even better idea of the effects of cost savings i~ 
home office operations results by using only the number of 
home office personnel. In this case, one home office em-
ployee was required for each $1.9 million life insurance in 
force in 1945. By 1956, each employee supported $3.1 
million. This represents a gain of about 64%, which in-
dicates that, although great strides have been.made, home 
office improvements have failed to keep pace with the ability 
of the field force to sell more and bigger policies. Of 
course, when comparing individual companies, many additional 
factors .enter into the situation, s·uch as the types of new 
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insurance being sold and the distribution of the life in-
surance in force. 
The outlook for the future appears to be favorable. 
All studies indicate that continued development of electronic 
data processing will yield substantial benefits in reducing 
clerical costs. They will, also, provide additional infor-
mation for the use of management in its decision and policy 
functions. This information will be obtained much sooner 
than would be possible using any other means. Thus, new or 
improved processes will result in savings on both the cler-
ical and the management level. 
An additional advantage stemming from the advent 
of the large computers is increased knowledge about company 
operations. The cost of these machines is so great that 
the decision, whether for or against them, can be made only 
after exhaustive studies of a company's operation. Thus, 
even, if a company decides not to take the step, at the 
present time, the study undertaken cannot help but be ex-
tremely beneficial. 
There are some possible disadvantages to large 
computer installations, also. One of these certainly must 
be their high cost. It is possible for a company to get 
involved in this area before its size warrants such opera-
tions. There is, also, the possibility that the new 
installation will merely result in additional reports to be 
filed in the so-called bottom drawer. Like any tool, it 
77 
must be used properly. If it is not, then its high cost 
-might have a disastrous effect on a company's profits. 
Another development that bodes well for the life 
insurance industry is that of operations!! research. This 
involves the application of scientific methods to opera-
tional problems. Mathematical or linear programming is 
used to determine solutions to such problems as maximum ad~ 
vertising etfectiveness, optimum size of the sales force and 
the amount of clerical help needed for a specific operation. 
There are numerous people close to the fields of automation 
and operations' research who believe that recent and coming 
developments in these fields will, eventually, result in 
drastic changes that will affect even the organizational 
structure of life insurance companies. 
What is the significance to an inve.stor of an in-
crease in the ope~ating expenses of a specific company? 
There may be none at all, if this is accompanied by rising 
sales. In such a case, it would even be possible to have a 
rising expense ratio and rising profits at the same time. 
Some indication of the effect of changes in opera-
ting expenses can be gained by relating changes in the 
expense ratio to total income and to net worth. If total 
income is multiplied by the increase in the expense ratio, 
the result-is the amount by which earnings would be reduced. 
A further indication can be obtained by comparing 
the changes in net gain and operating expenses. For instance, 
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Commonwealth Life Insurance Co. shows an increase of 185% 
in net gain between 1953 and 1957, while its operating ex-
penses increased only 32%. 12 Assuming that all other 
factors remained equal, such a development would be favor-
able for any company. 
Therefore, an investor should compare expense 
ratios between different companies, but only in their proper 
context. He must relate the information to other available 
d~ta before he can be sure that the ratios represent a valid 
comparison. 
D. Taxes. 
The life insurance industry is subjected to tax-
ation from federal, state and local governments, as are most 
industries, but in the life insurance industry the role of 
the state government is relatively more important. Based 
on 1958 operations, .the life insurance industry paid approxi-
mately $850 million in taxes, of which about $500 million 
was due under a revised federal income tax law and the 
13 balance due to state and local governments. 
Although life companies are not heavily taxed in 
comparison with most other industries, there are many ob-
servers who feel that the taxes should be much less in 
consideration of the nature of the industry. There is a 
general lack of understanding, particularly on the state 
level, of the true nature of legal reserves. The tremen-
dous size of the funds and the ease with which they may be 
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taxed makes them a prime target. The various state govern-
ments are not uniform, but most of them tax between one and 
four percent of the gross premiums collected from residents 
of their state. 
These premium taxes were originally passed to pro-
vide the funds to pay for proper supervision of the companies 
by the state, but now about 95% of the revenue derived goes 
into general funds. There appears to be absolutely no 
chance at all for any return to taxation, only for super-
vision, so the companies have long since become reconciled 
to relatively high premium taxes. 
With the exception of a few large states, most of 
the states find the great majority of the insurance com-
panies doing business in their states are domiciled in other 
states. This makes it easy to increase taxes under the pre-
text that they are merely keeping money in the state that 
would normally flow out. The one big obstacle to this atti-
tude is the fact that most states have, on the books, what 
are known as retaliatory laws. This means that a company, 
domiciled in a state with a higher tax rate, will be re-
quired to pay that higher rate in all states having the 
retaliatory law. The result is that local companies will 
oppose any increase in the tax rate on foreign companies 
because they know that they would have to pay the same 
higher rate in the other states. 
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Life insurance companies are-- exempt from state 
income taxes in most states, although there are some excep-
tions. A large national company would be faced with a 
difficult problem if it had to break all its accounts down, 
state by state, so as to arrive at a taxable income in each 
state. Fortunately, most states regard the premium tax as 
a tax in lieu of the state income tax. The companies are, 
also, faced with the payment of various state and local 
licenses and fees. Generally, they do not cost any great 
amount, although they have increased somewhat in recent 
years. Life insurance companies must also pay the same 
general taxes that all other industries have, such as Social 
security, real estate and use taxes. Increases in these 
taxes have been steady, but they are not aimed specifi-
cally at the life insurance industry, and must be ~egarded 
as simply part of the cost of being in operation. 
Last year, Congress passed the Life Insurance 
Company Income Tax Act of 1959. Since 1921, the industry 
had been taxed only on investment income. The most recent 
permanent revision had been in 1942 with stopgap legislation 
since 1950. Under the latter, the companies would have 
paid about $319 million on 1958 operations but, under the 
new law, the companies had to pay about $500 million, be-
cause much of the law was made retroactive to 1958. This 
represents an increase of 57% in federal income taxes due 
to the cha~ge in the law. Because of certain changes in 
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the new law, it does not fall evenly on mutual and stock 
companies. Under the old law, the stock companies would 
have been liable for about 25% of the $319 million in taxes. 
Now the stock companies find themselves liable for 31% of 
the $500 million due under the new act. Therefore, the 
stock companies were faced ·w"i th a 94% increase in taxes, 
while mutual companies had only a 44% increase. 14 
The new law is very detailed and complex. As in 
most new tax regulations, some areas will turn out to be 
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ambiguous and will need further clarification. Regardless 
of their opinions concerning the law's technical aspects, 
most companies feel ~hat merel~ ending the confusion by 
placing a new permanent law on the books is a step in the 
right direction. 
In order to qualify under the law, a company must 
have 50% or more of total reserves held as reserves for 
life insurance, annuities and non-cancellable A & H insur-
ance. This is supposed to include only those reserves re-
quired by law. 
There are four steps involved in determining the 
amount of the tax. Step one, or phase I as it is called, 
is quite .similar to the old tax on investment income. The 
tax is based on the company's share of the investment yield, 
or that part which is not required to maintain policyholder.' 
reserves. The assets used in determining this yield are 
somewhat broader.than those used in exhibit 2 of the annual 
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statement. Various changes are also incorporated in the 
law, which may result in some revamping of investment 
portfolios. For instance, changes made in depreciation 
policies may force companies to dispose of some of their 
real estate holdings. The final investment yield on which 
the tax is based is actually gross investment income less 
certain investment expenses and interest payments. This is 
reduced by the amount added to policyholder reserves to 
. meet future obligations and the amount assignable to certain 
pension reserves. The result is the company's share of the 
net investment yield. The difference as compared to the 
old stopgap formula.is that the regular corporation tax rate 
of 52% will now be applied to about 21% or 22% of the income 
from investments instead of 15%. 
Phases II and III represent, essentially, the tax 
on underwriting gain. This is the savings in mortality and 
expenses actually experienced as compared to those assumed 
in the premiums. The act establishes, in detail, the manner 
in which this gain shall be determined. ·The gain is then 
divided in half and one half is taxed under phase II, at the 
regular 52% c·orporate rate. It should be noted here that if 
a company has sustained an underwriting loss, the loss may 
be offset in full against taxable investment income. This 
can be very beneficial to small companies. 
The other half of the underwriting gain is added 
to what the act calls the policyhold4rs' surplus account on 
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which the ~ax is deferred. The company may then pay divi-
dends to shareholders with no additional tax on underwriting 
gain, providing that it pays out no more than the amounts 
already taxed under phases I and II. To the extent that 
distributions exceed this amount, they are added to the tax 
base and taxed at the regular corporate rate. The idea be-
hind this deferred tax is that at least one half of the 
underwriting gain should not be taxed until long-term con-
tingencies have been settled. 
Phase IV of the act establishes a tax on capital 
gains. A capital gain or loss results only from the sale 
of an asset and a capital loss can be offset only against a 
capital gain. The capital gains' tax is based on the same 
rate that is applied to the gain from the sale of any long-
term capital asset. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
the effect of the new law is not only to increase the taxes 
paid by life insurance companies, but also to increase the 
percentage of the total tax that is paid by the stock com-
panies. This is because stock companies derive a relatively 
greater share of their profits from underwriting gains than 
do mutual companies. These higher taxes will, undoubtedly, 
reduce the earnings of all life companies and may, tempor-
arily, affect the dividend rates of the stock companies. 
From the point of view of the mutual company, the addition 
of a tax on underwriting gain has reduced one of the 
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competitive advantages available to stock companies when 
determining their premiums. 
Specialty companies may find the going somewhat 
more difficult until they can adjust. This applies partie-· 
ularly to those companies specializing in the types of 
insurance that feature a relatively high degree of protec-
tion such as term and ordinary. In the past, their federal 
income taxes have been practically non-existent, because 
their profits' source was largely underwriting gain. 
A definite attempt was made in Congress to include 
in the new law measures which would aid and protect the 
newly formed and smaller insurance companies. This attempt 
was, at least, partially successful. New companies formed 
in 1958 and later may carry forward any losses suffered for 
a total of eight years instead of the normal five. In de-
termining the company's share of investment income, the law 
allows a 10% deduction from the first $250,000. of the com-
pany's share. There are, also, certain deductions allowed 
in the determination of underwriting gain for phase II which 
are, primarily, of benefit to the smaller companies. A 
company may reinvest its profits, with certain limitations, 
in the operations of the compan~ without any tax on under-
writing gain. Thus, some consideration has been made for 
the small and newly-organized companies. 
The new federal income tax law must be considered 
an improvement over the previous stopgap legislation. 
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There will, undoubtedly, be new questions raised, which will 
require clarification, but the industry now has a permanent 
law and it must adjust its operations accordingly. Tax 
considerations have now assumed an even more important 
position among the factors which management must consider 
when making decisions. 
Taxes have, also, become a more important factor 
for consideration by the investor in appraising the status 
of life insurance common stocks. In 1958, before the new 
federal tax law, 4.0¢ of every $1.00 of income earned by the 
industry went for taxes excluding direct investment taxes, 
such as on real estate. This is an increase from 3.2¢ in 
1957 and 2.0¢ in 1955. Thus, there has been a 100% increase 
in four years, and recent estimates are that the figures for 
1959 will reach 5.0¢ for another 25% increase.15 This last 
rise reflects the new federal law. 
Therefore, taxes have certainly become an important 
item in the operation of a life insurance company, and one 
over which management exercises a relatively small amount 
of control. 
E. Dividends. 
Life insurance companies have developed a well-
deserved reputation over the years for paying low cash 
dividends. This has not resulted from an inability to earn 
sufficient funds. It is instead brought about by the de-
liberate policy of the managements of most of the companies 
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to reinvest surplus earnings in their companies. If manage-
ment successfully carried out its plans, the investor would 
be rewarded by the price appreciation in his common stock. 
~he record reveals that they have certainly done quite well. 
There are two types of dividends that should be 
considered in relation to the life insurance industry. One 
is the cash dividend and the other is the stock dividend. 
It is the cash dividend that has been so abnormally low in 
comparison with other industries. One method of illustrating 
the amount paid out in dividends is by showing the relation-
ship between dividends and earnings. Tabl~XI shows this 
relationship which might, also, be called the pay-out ratio. 
Table XI. Percent of Combined Net Paid in Dividends 
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~ Conn. Gen 11. Franklin Jeff. Std. Lincoln 
. 9i958 19% 16% 14% 14% 
1956 24% 15% 19% 14% 
1954 11% 14% 16% 8% 
1952 16% 14% 12% 
1950 17% 6% 
Sourcet Standard & Poor's, Industr;t Surve;ts, Insurance, 
July 1959. 
The four companies used in the table are among the 
larger stock units in the industry selling, primarily, life 
insurance. In contrast to the record of the life insurance 
industry, the stocks used to compute the Dow-Jones composite 
average showed pay-out ratios of approximately 69% in 1956 
and 72% in 1958. This, obviously, represents a substantial 
difference in dividend polic~. The table shows, beyond a 
doubt, that the money is available if the companies decide 
to pay larger dividends. 
The result of this conservative dividend policy, 
when combined with growing earnings and favorable stock 
price movement, has been ex.tremelylow yields. For in-
stance, one survey of 22 leading stock life companies showed 
an average yield of only 1.1% in mid-1959.16 Table XII 
shows current yields on a representative sample of life 
company stocks as of Mareh 18, 1960. 
Table XII. Current Cash Yield of Stock Life 
Insurance Companies 
Company Bid Price Dividend Yield 
Conn. G-en*l. $351. $2.30 0.7% 
Franklin 76. .45 0.6 
Jeff. Std. 46. .62 1.3 
Lincpln Nat•l. 235. 2.00 0 •. 9 
u.s. Life 40. .15 0.4 
·Source: Barron's, March 21, 1960. 
These yields do not compare very favorably with 
money rates for this period. As of March 17, 1960, the 
rate for prime commercial paper was 4 5/8% and time loans 
5-5t,%. For the same period, the yield on The Dow-Jones 30 
Industrials was 3/45% and the Dow-Jones 40 Bonds was 5.38%. 
It should be immediately obvious to any investor that life 
insurance stocks are about the last thing you would buy if 
you desired a high cash yield in the immediate future. 
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Due to high interest rates at the current time, the spread 
between the· yields on life insurance stocks and other pos-
sible investments is somewhat larger than normal. However, 
the cash yield on life stocks has always been low. In 
1945, Connecticut General, at its low for the year, sold to 
yield only 2.1% and Lincoln National 2.7%. 
The other type of dividend paid by life insurance 
companies is the stock dividend. Here, again, the industry 
differs from most others in that there is in this case a 
much higher propensity to pay stock dividends in the life 
insurance industry. This has been particularly true of the 
years since World War II. Table XIII indicates the amount 
of stock dividends for three typical companies. A brief 
consideration of these dividends leads to some rather in-
teresting conclusions. Frequently, a company will retain 
the same cash dividend on the increased numbdr of shares 
resulting from a stock split. At the time of purchase, the 
yield based on the current dividend may be low, but if the 
stock is retained for a reasonable length of time, the 
eventual yield based on the original cost may become quite 
attractive. Thus, low current yields do not, necessarily, 
imply low income on original investment. 
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Table XIII. Stock Dividends--Selected Companies 
Franklin Life Gulf Life Jefferson Std. Life 
Year Dividend ~ Dividend Year Dividend 
-
1958 5% 
1957 50 . 1957 10% 1957 25% 
1955 50 1953 25 1954 33t 
1953 100 1950 100 1950 50 
1952 50 1948 33t 1945 150 
1948 25 1947 50 1941 100 
1944 50 1943 19 1938 100 
Source: The First Boston Corporation, Life Insurance 
ComEanl Stocks, 1959. 
Over a considerable period of years, dividends 
have tended to increase for the stockholders of life insur-
ance companies, but, generally, at about the same rate as 
earnings. This means that the pay-out ratio has remained 
relatively low. The net result, however, for an investor 
who has bought and held life insurance common stocks has 
been a steady increase in dividend income even though it 
started from a very low initial point. 
There appears to ·be no reason to expect any 
change in dividend policy in the foreseeable future. A 
continuance of high sales will mean high additions to re-
serves. It, also, means the companies are always faced 
with the high cost of placing the new policies on the books. 
The combination of these factors and the ultra conservative 
management of most of the companies means continued low cash 
dividends. However, it should also mean that stockholders 
will continue to be compensated by growth resulting from the 
reinvestment of earnings not paid out in dividends. 
90 
CHAPTER VII 
OPERATING RESULTS 
A. Net gain from Operations. 
The cumulative effect of Chapters V and VI is re-
ported in the company's annual statements as net gain from 
operations. It should be clear from these Chapters, also, 
that it is quite difficult to use reported net gain for 
comparative purposes, because of the great variations in 
the type of business being written, the reserve basis being 
used and a host of other lesser items. 
·The insurance in force on the books of a life in-
surance company has a definite marketable value. It is the 
basis from which future earnings will be derived. If it 
has a value, then the increase in insurance in force during 
a year is actually an increase in earnings. To phrase it 
another way, a company that places a substantial amount of 
new business on the books has increased the stockholders' 
interest, and this increase should be reflected in earnings 
figures. A substantial amount of new business also penal-
izes earnings, initially, because of the high cost of getting 
it on the books. Therefore, a comparison of a rapidly-
growing company with one showing little growth, using unad-
justed net gain data, would have little validity. 
Most analysts make certain adjustments to reported 
net gain, which may vary as to their exact detail, but are 
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gendrally quite similar in their relative results. They 
attempt to even out variations in companies due to type and 
age of policies, reserve basis, mortality experience, in-
terest assumption, and other factors. The individual 
investor need not be concerned with the detailed calculations 
involved in determining the adjustment rates. There are 
numerous different sets of rates available. One method adds 
to reported net gain, $15. per $1,000. increase in ordinary 
life insurance in force, $5. per $1,000. increase in group 
and one half the annual premium for industrial life insurance. 
The increase in deficiency reserves for the year is also 
added to net gain. 
If the investor wants to make somewhat more in-
volved adjustments, he may use a formula such as was used 
by Blyth & Co. in a recent analysis. 17 This included add-
ing $20. per $1,000. increase in whole life insurance where 
the net level premium reserve is used, $15. for the same 
type of insurance where any other reserve method is used, 
$7.50 per $1,000. increase in term insurance, $2. for group 
insurance, $20. for industrial insurance, 20% of the can-
cellable accident and health unearned premium reserve and 
30% of non-cancellable accident and health premiums written. 
Because several states, including New York, restrict the 
amount that may be allocated to stockholders from earnings 
on participating policies, earnings may also be adjusted to 
reflect this factor. This analysis assigned a value to the 
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participating insurance that ·was"approximately 30% of the 
non-participating insurance in force. In this case, the 
increase in deficiency reserves was again added to net gain. 
If the investor understahds what adjusted net 
gain figures are and how they are arrived at, he can then 
decide what adjustments he feels are most necessary. From 
the annual statements and annual· reports, he may then de-
termine adjusted net gain for- the companies or, if he finds 
a statistical service that publishes such data using the 
same adjustments that he feels are necessary, he may avail 
himself of this informatipn and save himself a considerable 
amount of work. 
As an illustration of the differences that may 
result by msing various adjustments, Table XIV shows the 
result of analyses made by The First Boston Corporation, 
Blyth & Co., Inc. and The Bank of New York for one of the 
major stock life companies. 
Unadjusted net gain for the same company from 
1954 through 1958 was $12.32, $12.67, $10.25, $10.71 and 
$13.01. The unadjusted data reveals a percentage increase 
from 1954 to 1958 of about 12%, while the percentage in-
creases for the three different sets of adjusted net gains 
range from about 6% to 8%. Therefore, the adjustment of 
reported net gain has a noticeable effect on the data having 
reduced the growth rate over the five-year period by from 
33% to 50%. Of even more importance, however, is that the 
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variation between the three sets of adjusted figures is rela-
tively small. A comparison of other companies in the same 
manner reveals similar results as does a comparison extend-
ing over a somewhat longer period of years. Thus, the 
investor can make use of the adjusted data peported by the 
reputable financial institutions without fear of being led 
astray. 
Table XIV. Adjusted Net Gain per Share 
Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Company 
Year 
__________. 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
First Boston 
$17.47 
17.31 
17.74 
19.18 
16.09 
Bl~th Bank of N. 
$17.58 $17.58 
16.12 15.79 
16.40 16.30 
19.43 20.35 
16.65 16.60 
Y. 
Source: The First Boston Corporation: ~ 
Insurance Company Stocks, 1959; 
Blyth & Company: The Insurance Stock 
Survey, July 1959; The Bank of New 
York: Life Insurance Industry, 
April 1959. 
As.long as an analysis is being·made of only the 
more recent years, adjusted net gain provide~ a basic and 
fairly accurate means of comparison. There are, undoubt-
edly, limitations which·must be kept in mind, because the 
valuations placed on the different lines of business can 
only be approximations and, also, because it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to make adjustments 
for all of the possible variations. 
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If the investor desires to study the earlier 
years, prior to 1951, he must resort to some means other 
than net gain. The old form of annual statement had nothing 
at all like an earnings·~ figure of any kind. The most com-
mon method used was the calculation of the annual change in 
the surplus account. After determining the change in un-
assigned surplus, dividends paid to stockholders, including 
both cash and stock dividends, are added and adjustments 
made for any new stock issues or contributions to surplus. 
An attempt should, also, be made to include any increases 
in voluntary reserves although, in earlier years, this be-
comes quite difficult due to the failure of many companies 
to distinguish properly between various reserves. 
The resulting information is of value primarily 
as an indication of the impact that various events in the 
industry and the overall economy have had on earnings' 
growth. 
B. Earnings. 
We have now covered both the sources of the in-
come of life insurance companies and its disposition. The 
balance remaining from this inflow and outgo is the net 
gain and the entire process is reported in each company 1 s 
annual statement in The Summary of Operations. 
Certain adjustments should be made in the re-
ported net gain data, in order to reflect the value of new 
business and to even out other differences. In this manner, 
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it is possible to arrive at a figure which resembles the 
"earnings" reported by companies in other industries. 
The use of increases in unassigned surplus, as 
discussed in the previous section, is necessary as an his-
torical reference. Some questions cannot be answered with 
the data available since 1951, when the industry commenced 
using the new convention blank. One study made of the 
earnings of 20 selected life insurance companies, since 
1929, reached some rather important conclus~ons based on 
18 the increases in unassigned surplus.· The data revealed 
that, although the industry has a reputation for steady, 
yet stable, ;:;gwwwth. in such areas as assets and insurance in 
force, the same is not true in the case of earnings. The 
long-term growth record is indeed spectacular, but there 
have been periods w~en earnings showed sudden sharp declines. 
Thus, combined earnings for the £0 companies dropped from 
$15.7 million in 1929 to a deficit of $1.7 million in 1932. 
They then made a rapid recovery which reached 
$24.0 million in 1936 only to be followed by a drop to $10.8 
the next year. Subsequent years have not seen such wide 
fluctuations, although the grbwth in earnings is still in-
fluenced by economic readjustments. 
The main reasons for this apparent lack of sta-
bility in earnings are found in the relationship between 
earnings and total income, and in the fact that the in-
dustry has a high percentage of fixed and_ partially fixed 
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cos~s relative ~o total cos~s. Benefit paymen~s are not 
immedia~ely affected by a drop in new business. Even addi-
tions to reserves are at least classified as partially fixed 
charges. Many items of investment' expenses and home office 
operating expenses are also relatively inflexible. The same 
may be said of field expenses, except for agents' commissions. 
Comparisons of earnings and total income reveal 
~hat the margin of profit in a life insurance company is 
usually quite small. During the decades of the 30's and 
40's, earnings consistently came to between 3% and 5% of 
~otal income. Margins have risen somewhat in recent years 
with some companies now reporting 6% and 7%. The result of 
these relatively low profit margins and inflexible costs is 
a high degree of leverage. Thus, a slight downturn in ~otal 
income is accompanied by a much greater proportional change 
in earnings. This earnings instability has been reduced in 
~he last decade and continued improvement in profit margins 
should result in less earnings fluctuations in the future. 
Another important comparison that can be made from 
earnings data is the relationship between earnings on the 
various types of business written and total earnings. How 
much does each line contribute to the total? This informa-
tion should then be compared ~o insurance in force, in 
order to determine whether the company's growth is taking 
place in the areas in which it is making the greatest 
profits. 
As an illustration, Table XV shows the reported 
net gain for two companies for the years 1957 and 1959, 
divided into its component parts as reported in the Gain 
and Loss Exhibits of the respective companies' annual 
statements. 
Table XV. Reported Net Gain by Line of Business 
Company ~ Industrial Ordinary Group A&H 
Nat'l. Life 
& Ace. 1957 80.7% 36.5% 0.2% -17.4% 
Nat 11. Life 
& Ace. 1959 71.7 17.2 0.2 13.7 
u.s. Life 1957 98.3 18.4 ·--~Ji6. 7 
u.s. Life 1959 69.2 31.9 - 1.1 
Source: Computed from annual statements. 
The table shows that National Life & Accident de-
rives a large percentage of its profit from its industrial 
business, although this percentage declined from 1957 to 
1959. Life insurance in force data for this company indi-
cate that industrial insurance represented only slightly 
more than 50% of total in force. Thus, it contributed a 
relatively large percentage of total profit. 
Industrial insurance in force has been growing at 
a much slower rate than other types of life insurance and 
this has also been true at National Life & Accident. 
Therefore, this company derives much of its earnings from 
the area of the industry that is showing the least amount 
of growth. 
98 
U.S. Life on the other hand writes no industrial 
business at all. Its ordinary business makes the greater 
contribution to earnings, but the relative importance of 
group business is increasing. The latter represents slightly 
over one half of the company's total life insurance in force 
and has, also, shown the more rapid increase in recent years. 
Thus, the trend at U.S. Life appears to be toward a better 
balance between the business being written and the earnings 
derived from that business. 
Undoubtedly, the most important informa:~±o~o::" be 
' ' ~· _·.:,."'~!:~~ ... _;-~ ~ '-_, 
determined about earnings is their rate of gr~)k.ranfr~tn~4~-
~..;.·:-· -- _,~ ~ 
_:-.,-~- 1' __:: .. ~ r 
comparative standing with other industries._ ..:At compari;son : 
~-'?. E . ~; ~~ ~ -
of adjusted net gain for six life companies ~~inde~ ~befs 
;' -~ . - -·, /..c. ,_. - .. 
based on a 1947-1949 average reveals the variat.it>~_ in=-!ih~-,. 
~ ..,. --:;/·:;_:. ~";~~- .. 
results achieved. The same type of index has been-computed 
for several of the leading growth industries to provide a 
better comparison. Table XVI.indicates that these selected 
life insurance companies should definitely be classified as 
growth companies based on this 11-year period. Their re-
sults compare quite favorably with the progress made by the 
four industries used for the comparison. The close simil-
arity in the results of Aetna and Travelers, each reaching 
a peak in 1954, results from poor experience in the non-
life portions of their business. Practically every company 
in the life insurance industry showed rapid gains in the 
early 1950's, but since the middle of the decade, progress 
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22 
Table ~JI. Index of Earnings in S~lected Industries Compared io Index 
of Adjusted Earnings/Share of Selected Life Companies 
(1947-1949 = 100) 
9 7 21 Conn. Life Lincoln Nat 'L 
Year Chern. El.:&:!ui:Q• Off .:&:!ui:Q• Petrol. Aetna Gen'l. of Va. Nat '1. Life&Acc. Travelers 
i958 
1957 
1956 
"" 
~ t' 1955 
1954 
1953 
1952 
1951 
1950 
1949 
1948 
1947 
Source: 
22 9 7 
173 188 153 162 180 217 168 173 303 
198 197 201 203 180 195 140 163 324 
207 140 167 198 192 201 148 171 304 
216 146 149 174 175 250 145 193 281 
160 165 118 151 216 204 157 174 258 
136 140 95 146 172 196 146 154 230 
128 130 94 134 138 139 132 129 210 
132 120 98 138 102 121 110 128 185 
159 147 107 114 113 112 133 111 162 
115 112 98 91 112 112 108 120 113 
102 104 113 127 104 102 110 95 102 
84 85 89 83 84 86 82 85 85 
Industrial statistics computed from Moody's, Industrial Manual, 1959; 
Life Company statistics from The Bank of New York, Life Insurance Industry, 1959. 
Table XVII. Index of Earnings of Selected Industries Compared to Index 
of Adjusted Earnings/Share of Selected Life Companies 
(1953 = 100) 
21 Conn. Cont. Frank. Jeff . Life Line. Nat'l. s.w. 
Year Chern. El.:&:!ui:Q.Off.Eoui:QPetrol. Aetna Gen'l. Assur. Life Std. of va. Nat 'l. Life&Acc. Life Travel . 
1958 127 135 248 111 96 104 176 203 164 109 111 159 123 116 
1957 145 141 211 139 110 103 173 195 159 99 108 138 125 151 
1956 152 100 175 136 117 106 163 177 150 109 111 138 121 120 
1955 158 105 156 120 109 114 161 148 124 101 113 121 107 111 
1954 118 118 124 104 108 99 170 123 120 110 105 100 103 98 
Source: Industrial statistics computed from Moody 's, Industrial Manual, 1959; 
Life Company statistics computed from The First Boston Corp., Life Insurance Company Stocks, 1959. 
141 
116 
191 
197 
254 
171 
106 
83 
103 
124 
113 
63 
10 
LifeCos. 
122 
128 
124 
116 
108 
-G 
0 
Year 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
has been much less uniform. .In order to show more clearly 
this somewhat uneven rate of gain in recent years, Table 
XVII compares the same four industries with an even larger 
numbdr of life companies. This table uses 1953 as the base 
year. 
It is clear that the industry has continued to 
grow, but at a reduced rate. It was outdistanced by three 
of the four industries used in the comparison. It should 
also be clear that a purchaser of life insurance stocks in 
1953 had to be much more selective than in earlier years. 
While a 22% gain in.five years does not look too bad when 
compared with the petroleum industry, it is still only 
barely ahead of the gain in gross national product which was 
21% for the same period. However, if an investor purchased 
Franklin Life, Jefferson Standard Life, or National Life 
and Accident, he was, at least, rewarded with steadily grow-
ing earnings reports. 
Two conclusions appear to be warranted in regard 
to the earnings of stock life insurance companies. First, 
earnings growth has slowed somewhat in recent years and 
second, there is considerable variation in results as be-
tween different companies in the industry. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
MARKET VALUATION 
A. Market Performance. 
The market performance of life insurance stocks, 
particularly since World War II, has been outstanding, but 
so has been the performance of many other stock groups or 
industries. The investor must compare the performance of 
the life stocks with other groups as a whole and as between 
individual companies. He should also determine the vola-
tility of the prices of life insurance stocks or their 
degree ef fluctuation. Another factor to be considered is 
the increase in total value. This is merely another way of 
showi~g the record of appreciation, but it indicates more 
clearly the effect of the numerous stock dividends. 
Table XVIII is a market price index of life in-
surance companies from 1929 to 1954. Chart I depicts a 
similar index computed by Standard & Poor's Corporation. 
Certain conclusions may obviously be drawn from this data. 
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Table XVIII. Price Index for Life Insurance Stocks 
(1935 - 1939::: 100) 
~ Index Year Index ~ Index 
1929 383 1938 87 1947 150 
1930 296 1939 94 1948 157 
1931 166 1940 89 1949 184 
1932 74 1941 83 1950 235 
1933 69 1942 82 1951 307 
1934 81 1943 102 1952 394 
1935 162 1944 115 1953 475 
1936 118 1945 146 1954 767 
1937 100 1946 169 
Source: Porterfield, J. T. S.: Life Insurance 
Stocks as Investments. Stanford, 1956. 
Table XVIII indicates that the market price of 
life insurance stocks has exhibited the same tendencies 
that held true of earnings. Life companies cannot claim 
any real degree of stability, particularly in a serious de-
pression. If earnings are the key to market price, as is 
believed by many analysts, then this lack of stability in 
both earnings and price is quite logical. Both ~able XVIII 
and Chart I indicate, however, that life insurance stock 
prices have baen affected very little by the recessions 
since the end of World War II. Wars, also, have not hurt 
life stock prices much. The tendency has been to sell off 
at the outbreak, but then to resume their upward movement 
as soon as it was evident that the hostilities would not 
involve the civilian population. This will probably not 
hold true in any future war as ·the situation has changed so 
much that the civilian population of this country '\Vou.ld 
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almost certainly be involved. 
The general inflationary period of the last 15 
years has also not hindered the performance of life insur-
ance stocks. The period of most rapid gain came during the 
early 50's, which was somewhat earlier than the spectacular 
gains that eventually occurred in other industries. 
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Although tremendous gains in earnings were, un-
doubtedly, the fundamental cause for the rise in stock prices, 
there were additional factors which should be mentioned. The 
known policy of reinvesting profits would result in compounded 
profits in the future rather than immediate cash dividends. 
As long as income is rising, the leveraged position of ~he 
common stock is also favorable. An increasing awareness o£ 
the value of life insurance and vigorous sales staffs meant 
rapidly rising sales. At the same time investors were show-
ing increased interest in equities. These factors combined 
to force the prices of life insurance stocks upward during 
the ten years following the end of the war. 
Since the mid-fifties, however, price action has 
not been as favorable. Chart I, in which the life part of 
the index begi~s in 1941, shows very clearly the growth of 
prices from 1948 to 1955. It also indicates the lack of 
growth since 1955. As frequently happens, when investors 
become very bullish on an industry, the subsequent rise in 
price carried well beyond reason. The following section on 
price earnings ratios will also consider this overvaluation. 
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Price history for the previous 30 years shows the 
effect of different events on life insurance stocks, but the 
investor is more interested in price action under recent 
conditions. In order to portray such action, a tabulation 
has been made of the mean annual stock prices for certain 
selected industries as reported in Barron's. These industries 
are then compared to several of the leading stock life insur-
ance companies. Thus, Table XIX shows the mean annual stock 
prices for each and Table XX converts these figures into in-
dexes using 1950 as the base year. 
It is immediately clear that life insurance stocks 
have outperformed the Dow Jones Industrials and the leading 
industries since 1950 by a considerable margin. There cer-
tainly are individual issues in other industries that have 
shown equally spectacular appreciation, but it should, also, 
be mentioned that several smaller life insurance companies 
showed even greater gains than the ones used in these tables. 
Further analysis of Table XX confirms the indica-
tion of Chart I that growth since 1955 has been much slower. 
The annual mean price of four of the life companies through 
the end of 1958 had failed to climb back to the 1958 level. 
One other had just barely topped that level, while Connec-
ticut General and National Life & Accident continued to 
make steady upward progress. These same two companies also 
achieved the greatest increase in earnings over the period 
from 1947-1958 as indicated by Table XVI. 
Year 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
• 1953 
1952 
1951 
1950 
Source: 
Year 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
1953 
1952 
1951 
~' 
--- ........... 
Source: 
Elec. Off. 
Chern. EQuiE• &lui:Q• 
246 200 411 
250 200 328 
280 179 244 
262 158 186 
214 133 134 
184 96 99 
192 88 97 
179 79 98 
136 64 87 
Table XIX. Comparison of Mean Annual Prices for Selected 
Industries and Life Insurance Companie~ 
D. J Conn. Life Lincoln Nat 11. s \.[. 
6il Ind. Aetna Gen. of va. Nat 11. Life&Acc. Life 
210 505 208 309 56 213 94 115 
219 473 185 270 52 191 78 102 
215 494 188 256 62 222 76 113 
166 435 231 251 66 224 77 112 
125 342 141 164 41 144 53 79 
101 275 81 99 31 87 38 50 
108 272 68 79 29 72 32 39 
92 259 52 59 26 50 20 34 
64 216 41 43 25 30 17 32 
Industrial statistics computed from Barron's, Group Stock Averages 
Frank. 
Life 
73 
61 
58 
54 
30 
17 
9 
4 
3 
Life Company statistics computed from The Bank of Nev1 York, Life Insurance Industry, 1959 and 
Standard and Poor 1s, Industry Surveys, Insurance, July 1959. 
Table XX. Index of Mean Annual Prices for Selected 
Industries and Life Insurance Companies 
(1950 = 100) 
Elec. Off. D. J. Conn. Life Lincoln Nat 11. s.w. Frank. 
Chem. FRuiE· EgUi:Q• Oil Ind. Aetna Gen'l. of Va. Nat 11. Life&Acc. Life Life 
181 313 472 328 234 507 719 224 710 553 359 2433 
184 313 377 342 219 451 628 208 637 459 319 2033 
206 280 280 336 229 459 595 248 740 447 353 1933 
193 247 214 259 201 563 584 264 747 45.3 350 1800 
157 208 154 195 158 344 381 164 480 312 247 1000 
135 150 114 158 127 198 230 124 290 224 156 567 
141 1.38 111 169 126 166 184 116 240 188 122 300 
1.32 12.3 113 144 120 127 137 104 167 118 106 133 
Industrial statistics computed from Barron's, Group Stock Averages 
Life Company statistics computed from The Bank of New York, Life Insurance Industry, 1959 and 
Standard and Poor's, Industry Surveys, Insurance, July 1959. 
-5 
Jeff. 
Std. Travel. 1958 
81 88 1958 
85 78 1957 
99 74 1956 
86 99 1955 
61 57 1954 
44 31 1953 
33 28 1952 
24 24 1951 
17 19 1950 
Jeff. 
Std. Travelers Year 
476 463 1958 
500 410 1957 
582 389 1956 
518 521 1955 
.359 300 1954 
259 16.3 195.3 
194 147 1952 
141 126 1951 
In an industry where there are numerous stock 
dividends and stock splits, it is frequently easier to com-
pare the performance of companies by measuring the increase 
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in the total value of an investment. This type of measure-
ment takes into account both the non-cash dividends resulting 
from the company's operations and the stock market's appraisal 
of its progress and prospects. The calculation is made by 
starting with the price of one share of a company's stock 
in the base year, determining the number of shares that would 
be owned at the end of the period to be considered, and then 
multiplying these shares by the price per share at the end 
of this period. The difference between this final value and 
the original cost is the increase in the total value of the 
investment. 
Table XXI shows the result of this type of analy-
sis for several representative companies. The period 
covered is, approximately, ten years and is based on the 
1949 high as compared to April 30, 1959 bid prices. 
Table XXI. Percent Increase in Value of 
One Share of Common Stock 
(1949-1958) 
Company 
Aetna Life 
Percent Increase 
Conn. General 
Continental Assurance 
Franklin Life 
Jefferson Std. Life 
Life of Virginia 
Lincoln National 
National Life & Accident 
Southwestern Life 
Travelers 
U.S. Life 
515 
1305 
1181 
2550 
498 
107 
936 
658 
365 
427 
2934 
Source: The First Boston Corporation: Life 
Insurance Company Stocks, 1959. 
This table reiterates the tremendous appreciation 
in life stocks. With only one exception, every issue listed 
compares very favorably with practically any market or in-
dustry average that may be selected. It also illustrates 
the variations in the degree of success that an investor 
would have enjoyed. 
Two important conclusions should be drawn from 
the various tables and charts presented in this section. 
The first is that an investment in almost any of the larger 
life insurance companies used in these tables would have 
resulted in excellent capital gains, if it had been made 
sometime between the end of World War II and the early 50's. 
This was a period of nearly uninterrupted upward movement. 
The second conclusion is that an investor, since 1954, 
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would have had to be much more selective to show much of 
any progress at all. The opportunities for capital gain 
were still there, but only if you purchased the right 
stock. This is a conclusion that has generally been true 
of most industries in recent years, and it places a premium 
on the detailed analysis of prospective investments. 
B. Price/Earnings Ratios. 
The relationship between earnings and market 
price is fundamental to the analysis of any security re-
gardless of the industry involved. It is equally important 
in the life insurance industry. Either reported net gain 
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or adjusted net gain may be used but, the latter is normally 
preferable and is used in all calculations in this section. 
If it is true that adjusted net gain has more significance, 
when considering earnings growth and the results of opera-
tions, then it should also have more significance when 
considering the market place's valuation of earnings and 
earnings potential. 
There are several important considerations in re-
gard to price/earnings ratios. We are interested in the 
change in the ratios from one year to the next, the dif-
ferent ratios at which each company's stock sells and the 
relationship between the ratios for life insurance companies 
and for other industries. 
The ratios for life insurance companies have been 
in a general upward trend since World War II. This is 
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illustrated by reference to Table XXII. There has, how-
ever, been a definite slowdo'vn in the last four years. 
The slower progress of the price/earnings ratios 
in recent years appears to be warranted in view of the failure, 
Table XXII. Mean Annual Price/Earnings Ratios 
Selected Life Insurance Companies 
National Conn. 
~ .Aetna Gen. 
Life Lincoln 
of Va. Nat'l. L. & A. Travelers 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
1953 
1952 
1951 
1950 
14 
12 
11 
16 
8 
6 
6 
6 
5 
i7 
17 
16 
13 
10 
6 
7 
6 
5 
12 
13 
13 
16 
9 
7 
7 
8 
7 
13 
13 
14 
13 
9 
6 
6 
4 
3 
12 
10 
10 
10 
8 
6 
6 
4 
4 
20 
23 
12 
16 
8 
6 
8 
9 
6 
Source: Computed from The Bank of New York, Life Insurance 
Industry, April 1959. 
Table XXIII. Mean Annual Price/Earnings Ratios 
Selected Non-Life Companies 
Gen'l. 
~ Elec. 
1958 25 
1957 22 
1956 24 
1955 22 
1954 17 
1953 14 
1952 12 
1951 12 
1950 8 
Dow 
~-
27 
33 
33 
21 
25 
27 
25 
20 
12 
Std. Oil Chase S & P Ind. 
~ of N.J. Manhattan Index 
45 21 12 17 
41 14 11 14 
33 14 13 14 
30 12 15 11 
25 10 12 11 
23 6 11 10 
22 9 12 10 
22 7 13 9 
18 6 15 6 
Source: Standard and Poor's, Industry Surveys, 1959. 
of earnings to show much growth. The four companies that 
are primarily in the life business have shown steadier pro-
gress. Of these four, Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 
which, also, has a poor record of earnings growth, is not 
valued very highly by the stock market. National Life and 
Accident has pushed its earnings upward at a steady pace. 
This progress has been reflected in the market place by a 
rising price/earnings ratio which means that the price of 
its common stock has appreciated even more rapidly than its 
earnings. Earnings of Connecticut General, also, grew 
rapidly up to 1955. Since then, growth has slowed and earn-
ings have dropped off slightly. The market price continued 
to rise, however, which would indicate that, at a price/ 
earnings ratio of 17, the stock was somewhat out of line 
with the rest of the life insurance stocks. 
Aetna and Travelers show the effect of their fire 
and casualty interests~ Thus, their ratios reveal a greater 
degree of fluctuation due to their recent poor experience 
in these lines. The high ratios in the Travelers for 1957 
and 1958 result not from rapid price appreciation, but from 
a sharp drop in earnings that was not reflected immediately 
in its market price. During 1957, the earnings of the 
Travelers• life department increased rapidly, but even this 
was insufficient to offset extremely poor results in the 
non-life business. 
Table XXIII contains price/earnings ratios in 
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several other selected companies. These would seem to in-
dicate that the market prices of life insurance company 
stocks represent a reasonable capitalization of earnings in 
consideration of their past record of growth. Increases in 
earnings have been accompanied by steady increases in price/ 
earnings ratiosbut, with the exception of 1955, this has 
not been carried to excess. Until 1955, these ratios were 
abnormally low. After getting temporarily too high, they 
have now generally returned to realistic levels. 
C. Yield. 
The discussion of dividends in Chapter VI, Sec-
tion E touched briefly on the question of the yields of 
life insurance stocks. Table XII showed the current yields 
of several representative stocks in the industry which were 
universally low. This is not a new development, as the 
yields of life insurance stocks have always been low in 
comparison to those in other fields. 
Table XXIV shows the change in yields over an 11-
year period. The trend has been toward lower yields since, 
approximately, 1949-1950. Although the yield on life in-
surance stocks has nearly always been less than that on 
industrial stocks, this spread has actually increased in 
the past few years. Between 1949-1950 and 1958, the yield 
on the Standard & Poor's index of industrial stocks dropped 
by about 50%. The yield on the life stocks dropped even 
more sharply in this period. The average yield in 1950 for 
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iihe six siiocks in iihe table was 2.55%. By 1956, this had 
dropped iio 1.15% for a decline of 55%. 
Table .XXIV. Mean Annual Yields--Selec-ted Life Companies 
Conn. Frnk. Jeff. Line. S&P Ind. 
Year Aetna Gen. 14!!. Std. Nat•l. Travel. Index 
---
19.58 ; 1. 7 0.8 0.6 1.6 1.0 1.3 3.8 
1957 1.9 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.0 1.5 4.1 
1956 1.9 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.6 4.0 
1955 ·3.8 0.5 0.6 - 1.3 0.6 0.9 4.6 
1954 3.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.7 5.3 
1953 4.3 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.9 2.2 6.0 
1952 4.0 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.2 2.1 5.8 
1951 4.6 1.5 2.8 2.1 1.1 2.4 6.5 
1950 3.9 1.9 2.9 2.1 1.5 3.0 8.4 
1949 4.0 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.2 3.0 7.8 
1948 4.0 2.7 2.3 2.6 4.3 6.1 
Source: Standard & Poor's, Indusii~ Surve~s, July 1959. 
The investor considering the purchase of the com-
mon stock of a life insurance company is naturally interested 
in its current yield. Buii he musii aeeept iihe fact thaii iihe 
yield on any of the large reputable companies will be low. 
Successful reinvestment of retained earnings will result in 
rewards aii a fuiiure daiie. In recen-t years, an investor in 
these stocks has seen his yield on original cost increase 
s-teadily. Several companies have shown increases practi-
cally every year since 1950. 
The most important function of an analysis of iihe 
yields of life insurance companies is to spotligh-t differ-
ences in market appraisal. It is a generally accepted 
practice iio pay out a small percentage of earnings. 
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Table XI indicated that variations in the pay-out ratios 
for each company were relatively small. Thus, comparison 
of the larger companies in the industry is not complicated 
by abnormally high yields resulting from payment of a large 
percentage of earnings as dividends. 
Investors are willing to pay more per dollar of 
dividend income for Connecticut General and Franklin than 
they are for the other four companies. The relatively poor 
market appraisal of Jefferson Standard, over the last six 
years, bears further investigation. The investor should 
determine whether there are valid reasons for this appraisal. 
D. Book Value and Liquidating Value. 
In the analysis of companies in the financial 
fields, it is sometimes possible to develop a reasonably 
close relationship between the book value of a company and 
its marke·t" value. In such cases, increases in asset value 
would be reflected in book value and might then have a sig-
nificant influence on market performance. This method is 
frequently used in reference to bank stocks. 
Table XXV shows the increase in book value for 
several leading life insurance companies since 1947. It 
indicates that each of the companies has undergone a period 
of ·outstandingly steady growth. 
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Table XXV. Index of Book Values for Selected Life 
Insurance Companies - (1947-1949 =100) 
Conn~ 
Year Aetna ~· Franklin 
Jeff. Lincoln 
~ Nat'l. Travelers 
1958 348 
1957 289 
1956 282 
1955 262 
1954 229 
1953 174 
1952 153 
1951 133 
1950 126 
1949 112 
1948 98 
1947 91 
224 571 
231 505 
216 424 
198 355 
181 288 
163 227 
147 170 
138 142 
127 117 
113 96 
98 88 
89 
450 489 
392 428 
352 374 
320 320 
275 269 
223 221 
196 185 
169 152 
131 143 
114 118 
99 97 
73 84 
213 
190 
195 
186 
173 
148 
135 
125 
121 
110 
99 
91 
Source: Standard & Poor's, Industry Surveys, Insurance, 
July 1959. 
Tables XX and XXV, although not exactly comparable 
due to different base years, indicate considerable diver-
gence between book value and price appreciation. In each 
case, the market price rose more rapidly than book value, 
but the amount of difference ranged from very slight in the 
case of Jefferson Standard to considerable for Connecticut 
General and Franklin. 
Another way in which the relationship can be de-
termined is to calculate the percentage difference between 
the two as seen in Table XXVI. 
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Table XXVI. Relationship of Book Value to 
Mean Annual Price 
Year Aetna Conn. Gen. Franklin Lincoln Nat. 
1958 46.6% 36.9% 18.3% 38.5% 
1959 44.3 39.3 18.5 37.7 
1956 41.0 38.3 16.3 28.4 
1955 30.7 35.9 14.6 24.1 
1954 41.1 50.0 21.4 31.3 
1953 61.7 73.7 30.2 42.5 
1952 67.6 81.0 39.3 43.1 
1951 82.7 101.7 73.3 52.0 
1950 102.4 127.9 81.3 80.0 
Source: Computed from.Tab~e XX and Life Insurance 
Company Stocks, The First Boston Corporation, 
1959. 
This table offers further proof that life insur-
ance stocks were undervalued in the early 1950's. However, 
·the failure of this relationship to maintain any constant 
percentage reduces its value for market price p~ojection, 
unless some rather large assumptions are also utilized. 
For instance, if you assume that, through 1953, these stocks 
were merely catching up to their proper valuation and that 
those early years should be eliminated, you would arrive at 
some rather consistent percentages. The remaining years in 
each case show reasonably steady relationships between book 
value and market price. 
Whereas book value, or capital funds, as it is 
sometimes called, includes only capital, surplus and free 
reserves, it makes no provision for the stockholders' in-
terest in insurance in force, accident and health reserves 
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and various other special reserves. Analysts, therefore, 
compute a series of adjustments to capital funds. This is 
done in the same manner as the adjustments that are made to 
reported net gain. The estimated value of life insurance in 
force is based on the same amounts per thousand dollars, so 
that the results will be comparable. The new figures are 
known variously as adjusted net worth, liquidating value or 
stockholders' equity, but they each have, in this case, es-
sentially the same meaning. 
If the same relationship is calculated, as in 
Table XXVI, using stockholders' equity instead of book 
value, a similar pattern develops. The additional factors 
added to book value show a greater degree of fluctuation, so 
that the relationship itself shows less stability. Each 
method, however, does provide another tool for the analysis. 
They may be used to establish a range of prices and as sub-
stantiation of prices determined from other sources. 
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Table XXVII. Relationship of Stockholders' Equity 
to Mean Price 
Conn. Jeff. Line. 
~ Aetna ~ Franklin Std. ~ Travelers 
1958 92.8% 71.2% 24.7% 90.1% 83.1% 83.0% 
1957 90.8 73.7 24.6 75.3 82.7 85.9 
1956 85.6 72.3 19.0 60.6 66.7 89.2 
1955 66.2 66.1 16.7 64.0 60.7 62.6 
1954 96.5 88.4 26.7 78.7 83.3 100.0 
Source: Computed from Table XX and The Insurance Stock 
Survey, Blyth & Company, Inc., July 1959. 
There have been some attempts by analysts to use 
stockholders' equity as a measure of a life insurance com-
pany's intrinsic value. There is some logic in this approach 
because it does reflect the action of those factors which 
should contribute to the real value of the company. Thus, 
the effect of earnings, dividends, capital structure, 
assets, etc. are all eventually reflected in changes in the 
stockholders' equity. It also offers the convenience of a 
per share value that, in most cases, is in the same general 
price range as the-market value. 
E. Reinvestment Results. 
In the analysis of life insurance stocks, the com-
ment is frequently made that the low yield of these stocks 
is actually highly favorable, because it is the deliberate 
policy of management to retain earnings in the company. 
These funds are then reinvested so that earnings growth 
should be compounded. Therefore, it should be possible to 
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determine the relationship between the amount of earnings 
reinvested in the company and the growth of earnings from 
one year to the next. Admittedly, all of earnings growth is 
not derived from reinvested earnings. However, this is a 
situation where the negative aspects are more important 
than the positive. In other words, the retention of a 
large percentage of earnings within a company, combined 
with poor earnings growth, would be distinctly unfavorable 
for the stockholder. 
This relationship may be determined by dividing 
total earnings less dividends into the amount of increase 
during the period considered. An arbitrary period of five 
years has been chosen as sufficiently long enough to re-
flect the progress being made, if any. 
Table XXVIII. Increase in Earnings Related to 
Reinvested Earnings 
Co mEan~ 1954-1958 1953-1957 
Franklin Life 10.3% 14.1% 
National Life & Ace. 9.7 6.9 
Jefferson Standard 7.3 10.6 
Travelers 4.7 11.9 
Connecticut General 1.7 0.7 
Lincoln National 1.1 1.6 
Source: Computed from The First Boston 
Corporation, Life Insurance ComEan~ 
Stocks, 1959. 
Repeating the same calculations for these com-
panies covering the years 1953 to 1957 yields substantially 
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the same results. Franklin Life, Jefferson Standard, 
Travelers and Lincoln National all showed higher results in 
the earlier period. Connecticut General achieved a slight 
increase from 1957 to 1958, while National Life and Accident 
moved up from 6.9% to 9.7%. The largest drop was recorded 
by Travelers. Aetna, although not used in the table, showed 
satisfactory results in the 1953 to 1957 period, but recorded 
a negative figure for 1954 to 1958. 
In order to test the validity of these percent-
ages, the calculations were extended to earlier years for 
Connecticut General and National Life & Accident. Commencing 
with the period 1947 to 1951, the ratios were calculated for 
each subsequent period by adding one year and dropping one 
year. The result shows a steady rise for Connecticut Gen-
eral through the period 1951-1955. Then the ratio dropped 
by more than 50% in the 1952-1956 period. This occurred 
again the next year resulting in the 0.7% figure found in 
Table XXVIII. National Life and Accident had a declining 
percentage until the 1954 to 1958 period in which the trend 
reversed. This would indicate that, although earnings were 
increasing as was indicated in Table XXVIII, the rate of in-
crease was not consistent with the amount of earnings being 
reinvested. 
An indication of the relative size of the amount 
being reinvested by each company can be obtained by calcu-
lating the ratio of reinvested earnings to capital funds. 
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Table XXIX. Ratio of Reinvested Earnings 
to Capital Funds 
Company 1955 1956 1957 
-
Aetna 10.2% 9.7% 7.4% 
Conn. Gen'l. 12.6 8.6 8.4 
Franklin 19.6 18.2 16.0 
Jefferson Std. 8.8 11.6 11.3 
Lincoln Nat'l. 23.7 18.9 15.4 
National L. & A. 15.6 15.2 13.5 
Travelers 3.3 2.9 3.8 
Source: Computed from The First Boston 
Life Insurance Compan~ Stocks, 
~ 
6.3% 
10.3 
16.0 
10.4 
14.5 
14.4 
2.5 
Corporation, 
1959. 
The most striking thing about these relationships is the 
remarkable degree of consistency within each company over 
this four year period. Franklin Life and National Life and 
Accident were reinvesting amounts that were relatively large 
when compared to their capital funds but, until the most 
recent period, Franklin Life had been more successful in 
producing earnings through this reinvestment. Lincoln 
National was making poor progress because it was reinvest-
ing one of the larger amounts, but showing the lowest 
results, as indicated in Table XXVIII. The figures for 
Aetna Life and Travelers are somewhat misleading because 
their lack of progress results not from their life business 
but from their non-life interests. 
F. Earnings on Stockholders' Equity. 
An indication of the earning power of life insur-
ance companies can be obtained by relating earnings to 
stockholders' equity or liquidating value. This is arrived 
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at in a manner similar to that used in determining adjusted 
net gain, as described in Section D. of this chapter. 
Thus, the estimated value of insurance in force and the de-
ficiency reserve is added to total capital funds. 
In some cases, additional adjustments are made 
for items such as the excess of market or subsidiary book 
values over carrying values and equities in unearned premium 
reserves of non-life business. 
Earnings data provides excellent information as 
to trends and fluctuations over a period of years. However, 
if a rise in earnings takes place at a slower rate of growth 
than that of stockholders' equity, then a decrease in earn-
ing power has occurred. 
It is evident, from Table XXX, that such a decline 
has definitely taken place in several companies. It is 
more conspicuous in the Aetna and the Travelers, where the 
effects of their fire and casualty experience are again 
evident. Connecticut General, Lincoln National and National 
Life and Accident also show substantial declines. After 
holding reasonably steady for four years, the situation ap-
pears to have worsened at Jefferson Standard, also. Franklin 
Life managed to improve for three years, even though they 
were already at a high level in 1954. The slight downturn 
in 1958 for Franklin may~indicate the beginning of a decline 
but the level is high enough to allow some degree of flexi-
bility. 
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Table XXX. Ratio of Earnings to Stockholders' Equity 
Selected Life Insurance Companies 
Company 
Aetna 8.5% 
Conn. General 8.4 
Franklin 18.4 
Jeff. Std. 9.4 
Lincoln Nat'l. 9.2 
Nat'l. L. & A.l0.6 
Travelers 7.1 
1957 
8.9% 
8.4 
20.5 
10.6 
9.8 
12.8 
6.5 
1956 
9.6% 
11.9 
15.9 
10.4 
10.5 
13.5 
10.2 
1955 
10.0% 
12.5 
16.1 
10.2 
12.9 
14.1 
11.1 
!2.2.± 
14.2% 
12.3 
14.7 
11.4 
14.0 
14.7 
14.6 
Source: Blyth & Company, Inc., The Insurance Stock 
Survey, July 1959. 
This fine showing by Franklin Life, undoubtedly, 
results in part from its emphasis on ordinary life insurance. 
During the early and middle-fifties, the company completed 
the sale of all of its accident and health, industrial and 
group business to other companies. The indicated trend of 
decreasing earnings on stockholders' equity for the other 
companies is not favorable and bears close attention for 
future developments. 
G. Capital Structure. 
A capital structure that contains anything other 
than common stock is unknown in the life insurance industry. 
Complete common stock capitalization is found in all of the 
major companies. In spite of this, the common stock still 
represents a highly leveraged situation. This is due to 
the extremely unusual position of each company's policy 
liabilities, which frequently amount to over 80 percent of 
assets. This leveraged position contributes to the 
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fluctuations in the earnings of the companies. 
Another factor of importance that is related to 
the capital structure of each company is the relationship 
between the growth of total earnings and the growth of earn-
ings per share. If total earnings grow at a more rapid 
rate than earnings per share, then the stockholder is no~ 
getting the full benefit of the company's progress. His 
earnings would be diluted by new issues of common s.tock. 
Fortunately, this is a problem that is not of 
much concern to the investor in life insurance company' 
stocks. Conservative, long-established life companies have 
no need for new issues of common stock. Obtaining new in-
vested funds is not the periodic problem that it frequently 
is with industrial companies. The investor is assured that 
improvements in total earnings will result in either a pro-
portionate increase in his per share earnings, or in addi-
tional shares. The net result is that the stockholders 
receive the benefits of growth if the company is managed in 
a manner that will produce such growth. However, this means 
only that an investment will reflect a proportionate share 
in the increase in total earnings. It does not guarantee 
that the investor will receive any such proportionate in-
crease in his cash dividends. 
H. Summary of Valuation. 
In the final analysis, the investor has to arrive 
at two important conclusions relative to any individual 
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company•s estimated future performance. He must make an 
estimate of the company's future earnings and he must de-
cide what valuation should be placed on those earnings. In 
the last decade, the securities' markets have cast increas-
ing importance on long-term earnings trends and growth as 
opposed to the short-term approach. This is fortunate for 
the investor in life insurance stocks because they ha~e had 
favorable long-term growth in spite of occasional temporary 
drops in earnings. The emphasis on favorable long-term 
growth means that the investor would be wise to determine, 
as accurately as possible, the estimated earnings trend over 
the longer period of time and deemphasize short-term fluc-
tuations. 
The estimate of earnings should be based on the 
many factors that actually produce or effect earnings. On 
the basis of asset studies, the investor can estimate in-
vestment income. From life insurance in force, lines of 
business and relative profitability, he can estimate pre-
mium income. The same type of calculations will result in 
estimates of the disposition of this income and the result, 
after allowing for estimated taxes and dividends, will be 
estimated net gain from operations. 
However, there are several objections to this 
method. In the hands of anyone but an actuary, the possi-
bilities of error are enormous. Each estimate may turn out 
to have been in error by only a slight amount, but the net 
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,effect of all of these may make the result worthless. A 
second objection is that it is too cumbersome. The amount 
of work involved is out of proportion in consideration of 
the probable poor degree of accuracy in the finished product. 
The small investor can achieve satisfactory results 
by first projecting earnings on the basis of past experience 
and then adjusting them in the light of the other factors 
previously discussed. For instance, the analysis may indi-
cate that the rate of growth of premium income and/or in-
vestment income was beginning to decline. Therefore, the 
projection based on past earnings would be adjusted downward 
just as it should also be reduced to allow for the impact of 
the new tax law. 
In previous sections, it was determined that both 
book value and stockholders 1 equity had moved steadily up-
ward for most companies. They showed none of the fluctua-
tions that were evident in earnings or market price. 
Stockholders' equity is a better measure of real value than 
is book value because it includes additional adjustments 
primarily for the value of insurance in force. A projection 
of stockholders' equity will yield a figure which, when ad-
justed by the average percentage relationship between earn-
ings and stockholders' equity, is actually a second estimate 
of future earnings. 
The valuation placed on these earnings can be 
based on the average price/earnings ratio for the past ten 
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years. The highs reached since 1954 for practically all 
the companies definitely appear out of line in the light of 
the problems both certain and possible that face the industry 
and the companies. However, the low ratios in existence in 
the late 1940's were also unrealistic and a return to such 
valuation rates appears very unlikely. As an additional 
check on this valuation, the investor should apply the aver-
age relationship between the mean annual market price and 
the stockholders' equity to the estimate of stockholders' 
equity determined above. 
The investor should, also, remember that the 
actual earnings produced by the company in the future will 
depend on its management and their ability to produce a 
profit on each different type of business they sell. Other 
than rough approximations, the calculations of such earn-
ings by line of business, involve mathematical experience 
that is not within the realm of most invastors. The adjust-
ments made to earnings figures attempt to make allowance for 
the differences in the types of business, but they cannot 
also take into consideration the different profit margins 
each company will realize. To this extent, there is a mar-
gin of error, but with the limitations in mind, the investor 
can still arrive at a reasonable estimate of future growth, 
earnings and market value. 
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A. Current Problems. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The greatest danger to the life insurance in-
dustry in the area of the general economy would be a rapid 
increase in the inflationary trend. Historically, the in-
dustry has proven its ability to withstand minor recessions 
and even severe depressions. In the depression of the 
1930ts, there was certainly a drastic decline in earnings 
but at no time were the reputable companies in any danger 
as far as meeting their obligations was concerned. The ef-
fects of the small recessions we have had since World War 
II have been much less noticeable. Generally, they have 
meant only a slowing in the rate of growth. 
Inflation is more difficult to analyse. There is 
no question but what continued inflation creates problems 
in the sale of life insurance. The last 15 years have been 
years of inflation, and yet they have been years of tremen-
dous growth. This is because the rate at which the pur-
chasing power of the dollar decreased has generally been 
moderate, and also because the so-called ttaverage m~nn has, 
until quite recently, never been convinced that he was faced 
with permanent inflation. One reason for this is that the 
purchaser of life insurance, during these recent years of 
129 
growth has usually been a person who was also old enough to 
have vivid memories of the Great Depression. However, the 
growth in the next ten years must come more and more from 
people who were too young to remember those previous hard 
times. They know only the years of inflation. If these 
younger candidates for life insurance become convinced of 
the permanency o£ inflation and, if at the same time infla-
tion begins to move more rapidly, then the rate of growth of 
the life insurance industry will decline. 
While the mild inflation of the past has induced 
many people to buy more insurance in order to maintain their 
level of protection, it has also meant a tendency on the 
part o£ many others to turn to equity investments. The 
great beneficiaries of this development have been the mutual 
funds who have achieved rapid growth in recent years. These 
funds are in direct competition with the life insurance com-
panies for the family's dollars. As frequently happens in 
the intensity of competition, there have been some abuses 
on either side in the matter of selling ethics. The slogan 
often heard from mutual fund proponents 11Buy term and invest 
the rest" is even disavowed by reputable personnel in 
executive positions with the funds. 
Except for a complete collapse in the economy, 
there is no reason to believe that the mutual funds are go-
ing to disappear, although their rate of growth may decline. 
Therefore, the funds and the insurance companies have no 
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choice other than to reach an agreement that will at least 
involve recognition of each other's rights as legitimate 
businesses. This must also include some means of curbing 
abuses by sales forces. The question of dual licensing will 
continue to plague the industry, and one result may be that 
insurance agents will require additional training· in invest-
ment fields. 
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In this age of rapid technological change, industry 
needs vast amounts of new capital. To meet these require-
ments, it will be necessary to channel savings from millions 
of people to every available savings institution including 
both life insurance companies and mutual funds. The net 
effect of these developments is increased competition for 
life insurance companies. 
Another result of the increas~ng interest in 
equity investments has been the intra-industry disagreement 
regarding the merits of variable annuities. Although an 
impressive array of life companies .still opposes the entire 
idea, it now appears that the major legal obstacles have 
,been surmounted and that the sale of variable annuities 
will gradually increase. This is likely to have several 
important effects. The stock market will receive additional 
support on the buying side, but it will be concentrated 
narrowly in the top blue-chips. Commercial banks and mutual 
funds will both face increased competition from the life 
companies in the battle for retirement oriented funds. The 
most important repercussion, however, may eventually result 
from the faet that federal regulation, through the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, is now established in one limited 
sector of the life insurance industry. 
Initially, sales will be directed at group pension 
plans. Corporate pension plans have increasingly emphasized 
common stock holdings. At the end of 1958, they represented 
39% of the total in the plans. Some corporations have even 
set up their own variable plans. This is also the area in 
which the life companies have been losing business to com-
mercial banks because of the latter's greater flexibility. 
Eventually, most life insurance companies will 
probably be forced by competition to offer variable plans. 
The same qualification that applied to mutual funds also 
applies to variable annuities. In other words, barring a 
complete collapse of the economy, the sale of variable annui-
ties should grow steadily and those companies that get into 
the field first will probably find it quite profitable. 
Competition has developed in recent years from 
another source. This has been the entry of fire and cas-
ualty companies into the life insurance field, either 
through establishing a new company, or through the purchase 
of one already in the field. This enables these companies 
to sell all kinds of insurance coverage to a client. Al-
though this can be a definite advantage, its importance may 
have been overemphasized when one considers the high degree 
132 
of technical knowledge required for selling life insurance. 
The main reason for this entrance into the field, is prob-
ably the desire by fire and casualty companies to inject 
some degree of stability into their own earnings picture. 
Life insurance companies are, at present, prohibited by law 
from entering the fire and casualty field. Although they 
are actiyely seeking a change in the law, there is no reason 
to believe that success would be followed by any great in-
flux into the fire and casualty business. 
The effect of this increased competition will be 
tremendous pressure on premium rates. This pressure will 
also be increased by the many new companies that have entered 
the field in recent years. The net result of this competi-
tion will probably become evident in somewhat lower profit 
margins. 
The threat of federal regulation always hangs in 
the background of the industry and it must be recognized as 
a possibility, although not in the immediate future. If 
any large scale scandal developed that state regulation was 
powerless to prevent or control, there would be immediate 
call for federal control by Congress, and all that is re-
quired is the passage of the proper legislation. 
Expense control is always a problem. The industry 
has been successful in the past and there is no reason to 
believe it will not continue this record. This is another 
area in which a rapid increase in inflation would nullify 
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the fine work being done to offset the rising cost of labor. 
If this can be avoided, then the rapid introduction of 
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various types of electronic computers and other data pro-
cessing equipment combined with improving management pro-
cedures should be sufficient to maintain the present operating 
expense ratios. 
The industry has now been through one entire year 
of operations that were fully taxable under the Life Insurance 
Company Income Tax Act of 1959. The broad impressions of the 
tax are that, although the companies do not like the tax, it 
has not been as bad as expected. Instead of forcing a de-
cline in earnings from the preceding year, the result has 
been a temporary slowing in the rate of growth. The new tax 
definitely bears down harder on the stock companies, although 
the difference is not considered critical. Changes in in-
vestment policy are becoming more evident. An increase in 
equity investments where possible and in tax-exempt bonds 
will help to ease the tax burden. Now that the industry has 
adjusted to the new tax, it has established a base from 
whence to renew its growth. 
B. Growth potential. 
Certainly the problems cited above and other 
facts developed in this study must lead to one vital con-
clusion. This is that the fantastic capital gains produced 
in the industry in the early 1950's resulted from a com-
bination of factors that probably will not reappear again 
in the foreseeable future. One of these was a speculative 
over-extension in the market prices of life insurance 
stocks, which made the subsequent years, since 1954-1955, 
look even worse than they actually should have appeared. 
However, the outlook for future growth in the 
life insurance industry is still definitely favorable. The 
only question should be not whether growth will continue 
but how rapid will it be. For instance, total life insur-
anc~ in force has shown an average increase per year of 
9.3% during the period from 1948 to 1958. It is reasonable 
to expect that the annual rate of increase will continue to 
approximate this rate in the immediate future, although the 
size of the base from which the increase is measured is 
getting progressively larger, so that there will eventually 
be a slow decrease in the rate of growth. The reasons 
cited above should also mean that it will be difficult to 
generate any increase in the rate of growth. I~ recent 
years, there has been a very slight, but st4ady rise, in 
the percentage of the total life insurance in force held by 
the stock companies. Therefore, the outlook for continued 
growth for these companies must be considered definitely 
more favorable. 
A similar situation exists in the case of asset 
growth. The average rate of annual growth for the 11-year 
period from 1948 to 1958 was 6.8%. Because of the various 
problems facing the industry, it would seem that the 6.8% 
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growth rate should be considered the maximum for any normal 
future year rather than the average. 
The primary determinant of market value is earn-
ings just as it is for most companies in other industries. 
The outlook for earnings growth ·is good, but not spectacular. 
Since the end of World War II, earnings growth was excellent, 
but since then progress has been much slower. However, 
even this slower rate of growth compares favorably with that 
of most other industries and the investor, who held shares 
in the right companies, would still have done very well. 
Changing economic conditions and changing conditions in the 
life insurance industry indicate a continuation of the re-
sults of the last few years, rather than a return to the 
abnormal earnings of the early 1950 1 s. Earnings have been 
aided substantially by improving mortality experience and 
higher interest rates. The latter will be nullified to some 
extent in the future as the companies write new business 
based on higher interest assumptions. This tendency would 
be aided by competitive pressures to hold down premium 
rates. Mortality improvements will also be nullified as 
companies shift to new mortality tables based on less con-
servative mortality assumptions. 
The combination of these factors, plus increasing 
competition and the new tax law, will result in pressure on 
the companies to maintain their profit margins. In spite 
of the large amounts of insurance placed on the books in 
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recent years, a large part of it has been written in the 
relatively less profitable lines. Thus, the squeeze on 
profit margins caused by a variety of facters· will hold 
earnings growth to a rate of increase that should approxi-
mate that of the last four to five years. 
The investor should remember that these develop-
ments are not really new. The industry has been faced with 
all of them at various times before, with the possible ex-
ception of the specific type of competition. Temporary 
setbacks have been weathered in the past and earnings have 
always resumed their upward movement. In this instance, 
there has not really been a setback, but only a slowdown. 
C. Analysis. 
An investor who desires to conduct a serious 
analysis of a company or companies in the life insurance in-
dustry is faced with a somewhat unique situation. There is 
no real shortage of statistical information, as this is a 
regulated industry. There are required annual statements 
and reports of examinations which are public documents. 
Industry statistics are readily available from several or-
ganizations. Various investment and brokerage companies 
also publish some statistical data. However, the investor's 
greatest problem lies in the interpretation of the data, 
because much of the terminol~gy and accounting procedure 
will be completely foreign to him. Therefore, he is re-
quired to develop a basic understanding of the industry's 
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somewhat unfamiliar language in addition to knowledge of 
the operations of the industry. 
An actuarial background or mathematical talent 
combined with long exposure to insurance operations are 
pzactically essential for a detailed analysis of a life in-
surance companyts many complexities. This does not mean 
that the small investor cannot analyse the operations of a 
life company. It does mean that he must realize and apppe-
ciate the limitations of his knowledge. He can develop a 
workable and informative set of relationships and arrive 
at an estimate of future earnings, but particularly in the 
latter case must he be aware of the possible pitfalls. 
Most analysts believe it is necessary to make certain ad-
justments to reported net gain, but they differ as to what 
they should be, and generally the small investor will not 
have the ability to develop his own adjustments. Therefore, 
he is forced to rely on earnings figures developed by some-
one else. This, also, means that he is forced to concentrate 
on the larger companies in the industry. However, for 
reasons cited in the following section, this is not neces-
sarily a disadvantage. 
There is a belief in some quarters that these ad-
justments to net gain meet only part of the problem. They 
assume that one dollar of a particular type of insurance in 
force has the same value to each company when, in fact, 
they may all operate at slightly different profit margins. 
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The answer to this problem can only be obtained through 
complex actuarial calculations and intensive research which 
lie outside the realm of the small investor. 
With the information available and diligent ap-
plication, the investor 9an determine a range of values for 
the companies under consideration. However, it is advisable, 
due to the unusual nature of the industry, for the investor 
to make commitments in this area only after consultation 
with ~ ~peeialist in life insurance stocks. There is, also, 
a definite shortage of truly competent analysts in this 
field, which results partly from the specialized knowledge 
required and partly from the limited demand for such stocks 
as was evident in earlier years. 
D. Investment suitability. 
Ownership of the shares of life insurance com-
panies involves certain very definite risks. Their past 
record of somewhat unstable ·earnings and volatile market 
prices make them poor investments for those requiring safety 
of principal to any appreciable degree. These are stocks 
which combine high leverage, limited capitalization and a 
relatively thin market. They are generally traded Over-
The-Counter. This is a combination that results in an 
extremely risky vehicle for a short-term investment. 
Their low current yield also makes them unsuit-
able for any person desiring large current income. Much 
greater yield can be obtained in other investments with 
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less risk. Elderly and retired people should not normally 
invest in life insurance stocks, if they depend on dividend 
income for support. These would never be classified as in-
come stocks. 
There are four broad classes of investors for 
whom life insurance stocks should have attraction. The 
first is that group that is seeking primarily a hedge against 
moderate inflation. The past record indicates that life 
insurance companies do well under such conditions, but this 
group must also stand the risk that any rapid increase in 
inflation would have exactly the opposite results. The 
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second class is that of the investor in the high income tax 
bracket, who has no need for dividend income and, therefore, 
prefers capital appreciation which would be taxed when re-
alized at the lower rate for such gains. Certain investment 
funds, which concentrate their holdings in the so-called 
"growth stocksn, should also find an interest in life in-
surance shares rewarding. There are some mutual funds that 
emphasize investment in life stocks as their prime attraction. 
The fourth class of investors is that large group 
of business and professional men trying to build a future 
estate. These investors have no need for immediate divi-
dend return. In fact, they deliberately avoid income stocks 
and seek capital appreciation. As a class they are willing 
and able to accept the higher risks that go wi"th such in-
ves·tments. 
Usually the investor should restrict his commit-
ments to the leading life insurance companies. Without 
question, there are opportunities for large capital gains 
in the stocks of small, hewly-organized companies, but only 
the insider or the specialist is qualified to appraise this 
type of situation. The only attraction that a small company 
in this industry can possibly have is the possibility of 
capital gains and this is still dependent on the company 
making g~nuine progress. 
In addition to a volatile market price and fre-
quent under-capitalization, small life companies have tre-
mendous manpower problems. Any real growth is impossible 
until a good sales force has been developed. Lasting 
growth and earnings progress will depend on the establish-
ment of an efficient, seasoned management team in the home 
office. Manpower problems cannot be solved overnight and, 
therefore, sound growth takes years to develop. Many of 
these new companies have an initial flurry of activity due 
to aggressive advertising and then get stalled. 
According to the National Association of Life 
Underwriters, the life insurance industry has been bothered 
for the past ten years by the nspawning of stock pushing 
outfits that have no honest intention of becoming members 
of the family of American legal reserve life insurance 
companies •••• often their purpose is the fast buck and their 
pitch is as phony as a shell game.n19 Such companies can 
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be formed and go into business by meeting the minimum re-
quirements in one of the more loosely regulated states. 
However, they normally would not possess the qualities of a 
good investment. 
The conclusion that appears to be warranted on the 
basis of the facts developed in this study is that a care-
fully selected investment in one of the leading stock life 
insurance companies should reward the investor with adequate 
capital appreciation, although not at the spectacular rate 
that was evident in the ten year period immediately follow-
ing the end of World War II. 
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